
American Religion, Deindustrialization, and the Tofflerian Socioeconomic Wave Model

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes dominant American religious movements of the twentieth century through the lens of the socioeconomic wave model of futurist Alvin Toffler. The article identifies the prominent religious movements associated with the Second and Third Waves of Toffler's model and proposes three primary religious values that characterized the economic engagement of each wave. Second Wave religions were identified as Mainline Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Third Wave religions were identified as Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism. Second Wave religious values were identified as justice, community, and activism. Third Wave religious values were identified as charity, individuality, and piety. The six values are engaged in relation to deindustrialization, labor decline, and the changing landscape of American industry. The values were utilized to provide a Tofflerian perspective on the decline of Mainline Christianity and the rise of Evangelicalism in relation to the changing landscape of the American economy in the late twentieth century.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, futurist Alvin Toffler published *Future Shock* and predicted a radical shift in developed nations from industrial societies to information societies. Toffler (1989) described societies in three basic stages: First, Second, and Third Wave societies; in sociological terms, the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of an economy. The waves, as described by Toffler, pushed preceding societies aside to make room for social and economic progress. Toffler's model provided a metaphor of human history, demonstrating the social evolution of humanity from a primitive hunter-gatherer society, to an agricultural society (First Wave), to an industrial society (Second Wave), and to a postindustrial technological society (Third Wave). Toffler's economic wave model and the trends of the Third Wave were confirmed by other futurists, including Drucker (1950, 1989) and Naisbitt (1982).

First Wave societies (primary sectors), were agrarian societies where land ownership and the production and trade of agricultural goods dictated the success of the economy. Second Wave societies (secondary sectors) were industrial economies where factory labor, manpower, and mass production dictated economic success. Third Wave societies (tertiary and quaternary sectors), according to Toffler, were information societies where technology, data, and knowledge were paramount to the outmoded forms of Second Wave industrialism. The critical driving force of economic growth in the Third Wave was not the super normal profits that technological change generated but the

continuous creation of opportunities for perpetual technological development (Carlaw & Lispey 2003: 457). The Third Wave, according to Toffler, was the wave of continual technological progress that eclipsed the industrialism of the Second Wave.

RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND TOFFLERIAN SOCIOECONOMIC MODEL

Philips (2006) recognized that change in theological dominance tended to be the harbinger of broader political and social change. According to the perspective of Phillips, religion has a generative social power and its influence historically affects social values. Economic issues relevant to industrialization and deindustrialization were present in American religious life since the inception of the United States of America and just as Toffler's model of society and economics was represented in waves, religion as a social institution underwent corresponding transitions. As the economy and society in America changed, religion changed, adapting to the needs and ideologies of communities and individuals. However, religion made equal contributions to changes in economic values.

Religion significantly contributed to the American understanding of the nature of work, wealth, and social responsibility. Historically, religious traditions and movements displayed remarkably distinct patterns of both withdrawal from and engagement with American public life as social and economic progress occurred (Regnerus & Smith 1998: 1347). Although the economic attitudes of religious leaders did not always translate into action by local congregations, such attitudes represented the initiative of sufficiently concerned individuals toward ethical social change (Feuchtman 1988: 121-122). Whether the influence of religion on economics was positive or negative, it is an historical and contemporary reality that must be engaged. Toffler's socioeconomic wave model can be utilized to interpret shifting religious attitudes toward deindustrialization and can be used to better understand the evolution of religious thought during America's economic transitions. The utilization of the Toffler model is not designed to pigeonhole religious movements or stereotype religious values to diverse religious institutions and movements, but to provide a means by which religion and socioeconomic change may be broadly engaged.

THE SECOND WAVE AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

In 1860 at the helm of the Industrial Revolution, farming comprised approximately 50% of American jobs. In 1997, farming comprised only 3% of American jobs and the number continues to diminish in the 21st Century (Rowthorn & Ramaswamy 1997: 78). The First Wave of agrarian society is a long forgotten memory in the collective mind of American. Productivity improvements in farming caused the shift from American agricultural economics to an industrialized economy. Toffler (1994) noted that at the advent of the Second Wave, "masses of peasants were forced off the land to provide workers for the new 'satanic mills' and factories multiplied over the landscape" (Toffler 2004: 29). Factory labor increased and in 1892, when the Homestead Act was repealed and western agricultural expansion ended, the United States began to grow by urbanization and industrialization (Stackhouse 1984: 82). The Second Wave was on the horizon.

The Second Wave was characterized by the Industrial Revolution that began in the late eighteenth century and perpetuated after the American Civil War. In the Second Wave people left the peasant culture of farming to work in urban factories. Americans were dependent upon food, goods, or services produced by someone other than themselves. Industrialization caused vast populations to migrate in search of jobs. Large populations were compressed into booming industrial centers (Toffler 1980: 39). Society became massified in its work, commerce, transportation, and media. Toffler (1980) asserted that the Second Wave promoted broad social massification by centralization and standardization. People were condensed into ethnical, cultural, religious, and vocational groups.

In the Second Wave economics moved from a peripheral position to the center of American life. Toffler (1980) noted that the “explosive expansion of the market contributed to the fastest rise in living standards the world had ever experienced” (Toffler 1980: 40). With industrialization came the rapid prosperity of the American economy and the despair of the Great Depression. The Second Wave culminated in the Second World War: an explosion of “smokestacks, superpowers, and the atomic bomb”.

SECOND WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

The religious attitudes that shaped the Second Wave inform the analysis of the economic and social changes that were brought about by the Second Wave. The religious underpinnings of Second Wave ideology explains in part the motivations that triggered industrialism and launched modern capitalism into a wealth generating sociopolitical economic machine.

Early sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) defined the theologically infused economic principle known as “The Protestant Ethic” in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904). The spirit of capitalism was, according to Weber, an ethos, “not mere business astuteness, but the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself” (Weber tr. 1958: 51). The Protestant Ethic engendered the idea that the harder one works and the more property and capital one accumulates, the godlier one becomes. Protestant Puritans saw property and capital as a divine calling of which they were stewards, liberals saw property as a self-evident natural right for private persons (Stackhouse 1984: 70). The concept of increased individual capital was foundational to the success of industrialism, mass production, and factory labor in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

According to Weber the success of capitalism depended on the embrace and internalization of certain socio-religious values. Weber noted that during the Industrial Revolution, it was not the capitalistic entrepreneurs of the commercial aristocracy who were the predominant bearers of the spirit of capitalism; it was, according to Weber, much more the rising strata of the lower industrial class (Weber tr. 1958: 65). Weber argued that Protestants who did not come from dynastical families of Europe were empowered by the Protestant Ethic to commence the entrepreneurial industrialization of the American manufacturing enterprise. The principle of vocation in the Protestant Ethic affirmed the necessary freedom for persons in society to perform pre-given patterns of social role and to give social space for the working out of godly duty. The logic and social psychology of the argument were vital to the development of cities in the Western

World where “peasants and freemen became artisans, tradesmen, merchants, and manufacturers, and above all citizens with self-governing responsibilities” leading to innovative social change (Stackhouse 1984: 59).

Blackburn (1997) argued that the Protestant Ethic was based on the self-righteous dogma that those who worked hard were rewarded by getting rich while those who were poor only had their own lack of hard work and thrift to blame (193). The harsh realities of the dogma of the Protestant Ethic were eventually manifested in the American labor crises following the Industrial Revolution. Weber did not ignore the fact that the earliest Lutheran formation of the Protestant ethic of capitalism was that the only way of living acceptably before God was solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. Fulfillment of worldly duties under all circumstances was the only way to live acceptably to God, according to the earlier Protestant Ethic, as individuals should abide by his living and let the godless run after gain (Weber tr. 1958: 80-83). Prosperity, according to the earliest puritanical form of the Protestant ethic, was more concerned with the promotion of the divine calling that encouraged profit through hard work. Spending capital on personal luxuries was disrespectful to God; profits were expected to be poured back into individual callings.

Puritan values were eventually usurped, according to Weber, and replaced by a system of capitalism that no longer required ascetic values for its perpetuation. The shift occurred during the aggressive industrialization of the United States in the decades following the 1850s (Eckel 1920: 48). According to Stackhouse (1984), the first true test of American Human Rights philosophy was during the Civil War, where the issue was not only concerning the ethical veracity of slavery, but the conflict between burgeoning commercial and manufacturing economies of the north that was threatened by the southern plantation owners. The Civil War economy stimulated an American entry into the Industrial Revolution and corporations as social institutions became less a covenantal fellowship of those called to be responsible stewards for the glory of God and mutated into a legal fiction by which to gain wealth (Stackhouse 1984: 81). Weber believed that the new emphasis of the spirit of capitalism caused material goods to gain an unparalleled control over the individual which led to the more aggressive form of materialism that later concerned Karl Marx.

According to Colson and Eckerd (1991), the rise of a technical civilization eroded the Protestant ethic into a secularized, hollowed-out version of the work ethic. Erosion was illustrated by Calvin Coolidge, who said, “he who builds a factory, builds a temple, and he who works there, worships there” (as reported by Colson and Eckard 1991: 39). Factory labor demanded workers who showed up on time, who would take orders from a management hierarchy without questioning, and were prepared to slave away at machines or in offices, performing brutally repetitious operations (Toffler 1980: 29). As work processes were deskilled and routinized, workers were subjected to intense scrutiny (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 29). The transformation of the Protestant ethic sparked a corresponding development of a social emphasis in religion that fell in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Mathews 1927: 376). As industrialization became part of the American experience, for both American Protestants and European Catholic immigrants, religious communities focused on urban-industrial problems (Fuechtmann 1989: 104). A strong emphasis on community, justice, and activism characterized the religious attitudes

of the Second Wave and formulated religious response to industrialization and deindustrialization.

SECOND WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: COMMUNITY-ORIENTED

The turn of the twentieth century brought with it the peak of American industrialism and increased factory labor as rumors of jobs invited disadvantaged immigrants from Europe (Stackhouse 1984: 82). America urbanized with pockets of ethnic communities scattered throughout the Northeast and immigrants settled in cities as American industrial workers. Primarily Catholic, the immigrants strived to provide a better standard of living for their families through the abundant work opportunities that were available in industrial America. Lance Morrow (1981) asserted that the immigrant work ethic came at last to merge with the Protestant work ethic. In like manner, Kurth (1999) noted that it was the religious faith and the religious community that supported immigrant workers.

Second Wave religious attitudes were marked by a communitarian worldview that stressed the horizontal aspect of religion: the call to demonstrate love toward one's neighbor by building community among interdependent individuals (Penning & Smidt 2002: 99). Independent labor organizations emerged during American industrialism. Labor unions were found singing hymns on the picket lines, demonstrating that workers could form solidarities as "independent congregations recapitulated in the economic sphere from earlier theological constructs of human rights" (Stackhouse 1984: 83). In the face of deplorable working conditions, long hours, unsafe equipment, and low wages, laborers found a religious solidarity in mass organization.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, American Catholicism grew rapidly due to the inflow of European immigrant laborers. Catholics interpreted social concern as a missionary field open to conversion. The clergy of ethnic parishes had a multifunctional social role; the idea that clergy should be concerned about jobs and the social and economic welfare of people was a prevailing view (Feuchtmann 1989: 123). The new pastoral strategy of American Catholicism was adaptive rather than defensive (Feuchtmann 1989: 114). Because the majority of immigrant Catholic parishioners were laborers, the Catholic Church took a strong interest in organized labor. The openness of the Catholic Church to organized labor was formalized in 1891 by Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. An early alliance between the Catholic Church and American labor was a significant factor in preventing the emergence of a revolutionary labor movement in the United States (Abell 1968: 143). The Jesuits formed labor schools to train workers in union organization and industrial relations (Feuchtmann 1989: 119).

The American Catholic Church argued that work was not an individualistic enterprise; rather it was social (Russo & Corbin 1999: 82). Whereas American Catholicism was not as committed to capitalism as the proponents of the Protestant ethic, it viewed socialism as a poor alternative as "bureaucracy, political tyranny, the helplessness of the individual as a factor of the ordering of his own life, and in general social inefficiency and decadence" (Catholic Bishops of the United States, no.33 1919).

The American Bishops criticized the American Federation of Labor for its failure to demand or imply that the workers should never aspire to become owners as well as users of the instruments of production (Catholic Bishops of the United States: no.6 1919).

The Bishops recommended improving labor conditions, advocacy for a minimum legal wage, government housing for workers, and social insurance. In 1933 the bishops called for rigorous application of moral principles to big corporations and advocated for smaller units of business and production, admonishing that local communities should take pride in economic growth (Catholic Bishops of the United States: no.72 1933). Post Vatican II American Catholicism demonstrated a slight shift from justice to charity and emphasized that the mission of the church was to achieve a conversion of heart, a growth in compassion, and sensitivity to the needs of brothers in want (Feuchtman 1989: 119).

SECOND WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: JUSTICE-ORIENTED

According to Toffler (1980), the Second Wave brought with it a redefinition of God, justice, and love. A coherent worldview emerged that not only explained but justified Second Wave reality (Toffler 1980: 98). New theological ideas emerged as a response to the evils of industrialism, addressing its spiritual implications and social repercussions. The clergy of the Second Wave recognized that the ills of urban society were not simply the result of human depravity but reflected structural injustice (Penning & Smidt 2002: 98).

As the abuses of the industrialism steadily increased, the response from the religious community was bold. Although some industrialists argued that the exploitation of labor was a necessary byproduct of industrialization, Gardner (1914) discounted the notion that some men oppressed and exploited others, which had no more moral significance than that wolves devoured lambs. Gardner argued that man was an intelligent and moral being with an increasing ability to control natural forces so that they worked out on the human level only beneficent results (Gardner 1914: 142). The ethical struggles of the Second Wave caused religious communities to rethink their role in society as industrialists exploited laborers. The call for justice energized the movements for labor organization and religious solidarity. Second Wave religion, in turn, envisioned redemption of society in the world (Penning & Smidt 2002: 99).

Cardinal Suenens (1979), a leader in the charismatic Catholic movement, described two polarities in the Christian community: the conservative churches whose tendency was to remain neutral in social matters and the progressive churches that sought to liberate human society through the gospel and therefore challenge every form of established disorder (Suenens & Camara 1979: 83). According to Suenens, justice must be respected and rendered to both God and mankind inseparably; poor and rich alike were entitled, in Christian justice, to be nourished by religion. The establishment of justice was the fundamental duty of man, but justice concerned both God and one's neighbor (Suenens & Camara 1979: 9).

Gardner (1914) argued that if an individual in society was superior, according to the ethic of Jesus, he should use that superiority of power in the interest of others. It was apparent that the injustices of actual society arose from the fact that men used power selfishly and that the strong used exceptional power primarily in personal interest. Social order, according to Gardner, could not be maintained without some element of the ethic of Jesus, as a measure of mutual services (Gardner 1914: 144).

Further, Gardner (1914) maintained that social peace and cooperation was secured only by the full acceptance of the paradoxical principle of Jesus that the strong shall serve

the weak. Gardner asserted that the superiority of some individuals in society would not bar the way to self-realization of others, but would rather open to them the doors of higher possibilities; and the strongest cohesive force in society were the clasped hands of the strong and the weak. In a social configuration, Gardner believed that the value of each individual in society was capitalized as a value for all (Gardner 1914: 155-156). In like manner, Pope Leo XIII incorporated some tenants of socialist thought in his insistence that the state, or government, play an active role in the redistribution of wealth, property protection, and workers' rights in the name of justice and not just charity (as reported by Russo & Corbin 1999: 82).

SECOND WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: ACTIVISM-ORIENTED

At the end of the nineteenth century the transition from the dominance of Protestant Ethic Puritanism to more socially oriented religious attitudes was a transition largely provoked by the impact of American industrialism (Johnson 1973: 229). Simultaneously, the rise of modern social science gave scholars new conceptual methods for understanding the social forces that affected the Church's mission (Fuechtmann 1989: 106). Within a generation the Industrial Revolution created such problems for religion as to lead to a vigorous enunciation of a social ethic by alert religious leaders (Handy 1949). Religious communities were increasingly engaged in social issues. Second Wave religious attitudes of community and justice informed a call to social activism. Factions of the Mainline Protestant denominations, both puritanical and liberal, saw the need for a fundamental public theology to give affirmative shape to social institutions and to combat the superpersonal forces of evil in society. Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918) and other theologians in mainline Christianity introduced and promoted the social gospel as an alternative to the prevailing forms of the Protestant Ethic (Stackhouse 1984: 84).

The Social Gospel affirmed the concept of the Church conquering social evils, superpersonal forces according to Rauschenbusch, to eventually Christianize all of society through social activism. The attempt of the Social Gospel illustrated the rediscovery in Protestant theology of the social dimension of the Church's mission as a voice for social justice (Fuechtmann 1989: 109). Realistic laymen were largely untouched by the social gospel and did not share the official social passion of the communion to which they belonged. That the social gospel was not popularized at the lay level was probably the fault of the clergy (Meyer 1970: 75). Even though liberal clergy clung to the ideals of the social gospel, it had little impact on a grass roots level.

By the 1920s, the social gospel had run its course, but it took the stock market crash of 1929 to destroy the illusion of Social Christianity (King 1981: 435). Handy (1960) noted that the period between World Wars I and II was a period of "religious destitution not less severe than that of the concomitant moral and economic depression" (Handy 1960: 3). Karl Barth (1886-1968) saw in the German experience the danger of canonizing political arrangements as a Christian society (Fuechtmann 1989: 113). Proponents of the social gospel gleaned credit for the New Deal social programs and the success of the West in the World Wars.

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) criticized the failures of the social gospel and identified its premise as unrealistic. Niebuhr did not, however, find activism an unrealistic method to achieve justice. Serving as pastor of a church in Detroit, Michigan,

Niebuhr was an outspoken critic of Henry Ford. Troubled by the demoralizing effects of industrialism on the workers, Niebuhr allowed union organizers to use his pulpit to promote their message of workers' rights and documented inhumane conditions created by the assembly lines and erratic employment practices of the Ford Corporation. Niebuhr advocated a Christian realism, as opposed to the idealism of the social gospel, preaching that in social crises the best that could be hoped for was justice. Niebuhr (1920) noted following the First World War:

“The church knows what is occupying the mind of the world and it is anxious to satisfy that interest. If it expresses liberal or radical sentiments on current industrial or social problems it frequently betrays a greater desire to hold the workingman for the church than to establish justice for him (Niebuhr 1920: 588).”

Niebuhr's criticism of the social gospel and his program for theological and political renewal helped churches recover from the period of Protestant downturn between the World Wars (Johnson 1982: 189). The work of Niebuhr contributed to the later social activism of Mainline Protestantism in the early second half of the twentieth century.

THE PROMINENCE OF MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM AND ROMAN CATHOLICISM AT THE END OF THE SECOND WAVE

As the Second Wave drew to a close, liberal Protestant clergy remained socially active in the political controversies of the 1960s (Quinley 1974). After the Civil Rights movement, American Protestant clergy learned something about political protest and were willing to make general connections between religion and public policy (Fuechtmann 1989: 119). Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics were once socially active in battling the ill-effects of industrialization, but by the 1970s they found themselves battling the ill-effects of deindustrialization. The labor crises of the 1970s elicited a new response from Protestant clergy toward American manufacturing and labor relations as America transitioned into the Third Wave society and economy.

The 1976 General Conference of the United Methodist Church issued a positional paper entitled, Unemployment: 1976 General Conference Statement stating that every citizen of the United States had a right to meaningful, useful, rewarding employment contributing to the public good at a wage that was supportive of an adequate standard of living with human dignity. The 188th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church released a 1976 study exploring neighborhood-based models for job creation. The 11th General Synod of the United Church of Christ called for a reaffirmation to the God-given right of all persons to useful and remunerative work, together with the responsibility to provide for themselves and their dependents. As the unemployment rate increased in urban areas of the Northeast and Midwest, in 1975 the Catholic bishops declared that opportunities for work should be provided for all able and willing to work (Catholic Bishops of the United States 1975).

THE THIRD WAVE AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL BOOM

Weber (tr. 1958) recognized that the modern Western form of capitalism was strongly influenced by the development of technological possibilities. Unlike previous waves of progress, the Third Wave was peculiarly characterized by technology. Toffler (1994) noted an early indication of a technological shift in society and industry when the Second Wave's smokestack economy was fading and a new Third Wave economy was born. The indication of the approaching end of the Second Wave was in 1956, the first year in which white-collar and service employees outnumbered blue-collar factory workers in the United States (Toffler 1994: 41). The Third Wave followed with a rapid increase of technology, including the emergence of cellular telephones, satellite television, and the Internet, outmoding the older forms of Second Wave industrialism. Populations that once relied on mass media and social structures were individually empowered by personal computers and consumer credit in the Third Wave.

At the helm of the Third Wave organized labor, pounded by years of union-busting and deindustrialization, decreased to less than 10% of the private-sector workforce and seemed to disappear altogether from the popular consciousness (Frank 2000). Service jobs replaced many of the well-paid positions lost in manufacturing. In the Third Wave American jobs created by high-tech globalization replaced the low-tech jobs lost to competition under Free Trade agreements (Cetron & Davies 2005: 42). There was no direct demand for labor in the Third Wave economy. Instead, demand for labor was derived from product demand, the goods and services workers made, which sparked demand for people to make them (Hill 2001: 61). Organized labor, once dominant in the Second Wave, was eclipsed by the demands of an individualistic Third Wave workforce driven by technological advancement.

The old paradigm of unions versus corporations was obsolete in the Third Wave (Cetron & Davies 2005: 44). Member unions withdrew from the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) because of disputes over the politicization of the labor movement. In place of unions and corporations negotiating for mutual benefit, the Third Wave brought powerful forces inspiring demands for greater transparency and accountability in large institutions; a product of the demands by Second Wave religious demands for social justice in deindustrialization (Cetron & Davies 2005: 39). An increased transparency and a greater corporate responsibility to care for workers affected by downsizing in the transition from the Second Wave set the Third Wave manufacturing crises apart from the labor crises of the Second Wave. Where corporations were more open to scrutiny and organized labor was a less relevant factor, the Third Wave was symbolized by a demassification of industry, society, and economics.

As society increasingly demassified, according to Toffler (1980), "the media, families, and even religion followed suit" (165). In the Third Wave, the market and the people were both understood as grand principles of social life rather than particulars and were seen as one in the same (Frank 2000). Kurth (1999) identified a new individualistic ideology characterized by consumer sovereignty in economics that dominated the Third Wave. The amount of outstanding consumer credit more than doubled between 1980 and 1990 (Philips 2006: 271). Consumerism and individualism reigned supreme in the Third Wave society and economy.

An increase in individualism was one of the major social changes that occurred in the West during the second half of the twentieth century (Crompton 2002: 537). Beginning in the 1970s, American political and intellectual elites began to promote the ideology of universal human rights as the rights of individuals (Kurth 1999: 8). The more contemporary concept of individual human rights stood in contrast with earlier social movements where the rights of entire social segments such as labor union and racial groups were emphasized over individual rights (Collins 2005: 109). Second Wave religion lobbied for the rights of women, laborers, and African Americans. Human rights philosophy in the Third Wave, particularly in Third Wave economies, emphasized individual human rights over the rights of groups.

Toffler (1980) urged that there would be a clash of civilizations between social segments committed to maintaining the Second Wave and social segments committed to Third Wave progress. Toffler predicted that society would be divided between Second Wave people committed to maintaining the dying order and Third Wave people committed to constructing a radically different tomorrow (Toffler 1980: 16). Deindustrialized cities in the Rust Belt of America illustrated Toffler's predictions, as manufacturing crises provoked conflict between Second Wave and Third Wave social divisions. Individualistic consumers of the Third Wave clashed with the community-oriented labor force of the Second Wave.

Although Toffler and other futurists predicted the economic shift from industrial manufacturing to information technology for some time, American labor unions did not collectively heed the call. Second Wave political lobbies and labor unions continued to cling to the power of the unskilled American labor of Second Wave industrialism (Toffler 2004: 34). In many deindustrialized communities, the transition into the Third Wave was stifled by Second Wave resistance to Third Wave economic and social trends.

THIRD WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

A shift in American religious life occurred that was consistent with the socioeconomic changes brought about by the advent of the Third Wave. Mainline Protestantism and Roman Catholicism were prominent in the Second Wave society and labor crises, but Evangelicalism became prominent in American public life in the Third Wave. The eclipse of Mainline Christianity with Evangelical Christianity was related to the mutual values of Third Wave economics and Third Wave religion.

Early in the twentieth century Protestantism split into two factions: the liberal wing which remained dominant by accommodating theologically to forces of modernity, and a conservative wing that seemed, by the 1920s, to have submerged from public life (Hammond 1985: 53). Whereas Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics focused on issues of social justice in the Second Wave, evangelicals withdrew their energies from political life and focused attention on evangelism (Penning & Smidt 2002: 99). The dominant religion of the Second Wave, Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics, gave way to evangelicalism as America transitioned into the Third Wave. Noll (2002) observed that the previously marginal evangelicals became larger and more prominent, but the previously central mainline denominations moved to the margins (pp.176-178).

The American religious landscape changed with the American labor markets. The decline of manufacturing and labor in the Third Wave was consistent with a decline in

Second Wave religion. Since 1965, liberal denominations declined at an average five-year rate of 4.6%, while evangelical denominations increased at an average five-year rate of 8% (Collins 2005: 19). Mainline Protestant denominations began to decline in America in the 1960s; mainly because clergy were often seen as too liberal for their congregations, siding with causes such as war-protests and civil rights (Philips 2006). According to Green (2004), evangelicals outnumbered Mainline Protestants in the United States, comprising 26.3% of the population, compared to 16.0% for Mainline Protestant .

Roman Catholics comprised 17.5% of the population. In Third Wave America Muslims outnumbered Presbyterians and Episcopalians (Kimball 2002). The mainline Denominations lost parishioners just as the industrial cities have bled jobs (Straub 2006). Fundamentalist, right-wing churches grew rapidly. Second Wave religion was “downsized” with Second Wave industry.

Second Wave religion remained significantly quiet during the 2007 manufacturing crises of Youngstown. Regnerus and Smith (1998) suggested that Mainline Protestants were more reserved since the activism of the social gospel movement early in the first half of the twentieth century and the Civil Rights movement in the second half of the twentieth century. Mainline Protestant churches were more privatized in their religious function and less concerned with public engagement. Regnerus and Smith (1998) found that:

“A significant minority of Americans resist individual-level privatization. They want religion to speak to social and political issues, and act accordingly. Among religious traditions, conservative movements such as evangelical Protestantism are the most publicly oriented, constituting a reversal of past generations. Liberal Protestants, once the most powerful religious voice in public arenas, are now much more privatized than conservative traditions” (1347).

THE PROMINENCE OF EVANGELICALISM IN THE THIRD WAVE

Evangelicalism was effectively shaped by the ideologies of the Third Wave. Shuman and Meador (2003) maintained that evangelicalism in America was shaped by three of the “most fundamental tendencies of contemporary North Atlantic culture and its attendant consumer capitalism: radical individualism, narcissism, and therapeutic sensibility” (71). Evangelical Christianity shared many of the values of the Third Wave culture predicted by Toffler, which explained its rise to prominence in American religious life. The success of Evangelicalism may be traced to its adaptation to the Third Wave cultural idioms of consumerism and individualism (Balmer 2004). Evangelicalism succeeded in the Third Wave because of its adaptability to cultural trends.

Evangelicalism's ability to adapt to the Third Wave was noted by Balmer (2004):

“One of the reasons for the success of evangelicalism, if you compare it, say, for example, with Mainline Protestantism, is that evangelicalism is always looking for novelty. It's looking for innovation, always looking for the latest edge in communicating to the larger public. In more tradition-bound religious movements, whether it's Presbyterianism or the Episcopal Church or something like that, you have liturgical rubrics, you have centuries or at least decades of

tradition, and people are reluctant to countermand that tradition. Evangelicals have no problem with that” (2).

The ideals of evangelicalism attracted working class people once claimed by Second Wave religion. A 1986 pastoral letter from the American Catholic Bishops entitled, A Pastoral Letter on Economic Justice for All, stated that labor unions themselves were challenged by the present economic environment to seek new ways of doing business (as reported by Russo & Corbin 1999: 83). Hicks (2006) recognized that evangelical churches were available for mobilization by Third Wave ideologies because prominent religious pillars of fundamentalist market reform efforts were likely where mobilization by labor unions was weak. In the Third Wave, evangelicalism assumed a new role in filling a void left by Second Wave religion. Straub (2006) noted this trend relevant to the deindustrialization in the rustbelt state of Ohio:

“The old interlocking forms of New Deal social democracy—urban machine/social safety net/unionized mass-production industry—are on a terminal slide to extinction. As all over America, they are gradually being replaced by a new comprehensive social organization—nonunion Wal-Mart jobs/antisocial exurban sprawl/hyper-individualist consumerism—whose value system is as oriented towards the Republican right as the old New Deal was to FDR Democrats. In this equation, the role of ideological prime movers has switched: just as left-wing CIO unions used to be the instigators and organizers of the discontent that created the rest of the social structure, now it is the equally (but oppositely) ideological evangelical churches that stoke the fires of blue-collar anger... Wal-Mart has replaced the steel companies as the state’s largest employer; the sprawling exurbs of Columbus and Cincinnati have replaced Cleveland as its fastest growing areas; and the Assemblies of God and Church of the Nazarene are the new Steelworkers and Autoworkers (2)”.

According to Straub, the conservative evangelical movement led to both a growth in adherents and a shift to the right for mainstream Christianity. Straub noted that “the left has all but abandoned these places where the factories closed and unions died ... a right-wing network of churches and businesses offered exactly what the CIO once did: both short-term material gains for members and a militantly transformative vision of the world” (Straub 2006: 8). Calsoupes (1998) affirmed that for adults in career transition, the need to be involved in a meaningful activity was strong; Evangelicalism provided the worker affected by corporate downsized the social solidarity that was once characteristic of Second Wave religion and industry (116). Dana Millbank of the Washington Post noted that “religious conservatives, evangelical churches, have become sort of the new labor unions” (as reported by Straub 2006: 5). The Third Wave transition in American economic and religious life led to the formulation of three primary Third Wave socio-religious values: individuality, piety, and charity.

THIRD WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: INDIVIDUALITY-FOCUSED

A social attitude characteristic of the Third Wave society was individualism. Evangelicals largely preached an individual gospel focused on the transformation of individual lives by means of conversion (Penning & Smidt 2002: 98). In the mid-1980s, 33% of participants told the Gallup Poll that they had been personally born again and by the early 2000s, 46% concurred (as reported by Philips 2006: 106). Unlike the religion of the Second Wave, the individualistic worldview of evangelicals emphasized that social problems were best addressed by changing individual hearts rather than by reforming social institutions (Penning & Smidt 2002: 117).

Social struggles in the Third Wave society were conflicts between older community values and newer individualistic values (Russo 2004: 628). Like the suburbanization of work in the Third Wave, evangelical apologist Guinness recognized that evangelicalism became a “rather shallow suburban experience” (as reported by Matzat 1995: 2). Patterns of evangelical affiliation in the Third Wave were shaped less by the Second Wave ethno-religious patterns of belonging and more by individuals who decided whether the church was meeting their particular needs or serving them as they wished (Penning & Smidt 2002: 102).

Third Wave individualism was symbiotically accompanied by consumerism. The consumerism of the Third Wave fed the notion that faith was an individualistic product that was marketed (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 47). Kale (2004) noted a greater thrust toward the individualization of spirituality among consumers that characterized modern evangelicalism (92). Unlike the Mainline denominations and Roman Catholicism that dominated the Second Wave, evangelical denominations and independent churches adopted a free market philosophy of church growth: religion of the Third Wave utilized the latest in advertising and marketing techniques to sell religion (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 55). Most evangelical clergy had the opportunity to effectively market his or her church like an entrepreneur would market a product. In the Third Wave, evangelical religion was largely a competitive market segment. Desperation to compete moved the rush to “market the faith” in the Third Wave (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 75).

Huntington (1996) noted that as the individualism and consumerism that characterized contemporary evangelicalism spread through a globalized economy, there was almost no resistance in those nations with a Protestant tradition, however, there was some resistance in those with a Roman Catholic tradition. According to Strenski (2004), economic globalization required ideological legitimization and the primary ideologies which informed globalization were explicitly theological. Strenski (2004) maintained that Third Wave globalization retained traces of reliance on its original religious basis (631). The globalization that characterized the Third Wave was traced to evangelical values. Kurth (1999) noted that globalization, by breaking up and dissolving every traditional, local, and national structure, brought about the universal triumph of expressive individualism (4). Evangelical religion sanctified market capitalism and raised individualism to theological prominence (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 128). Evangelicals adopted the Third Wave social and economic principle of individualistic consumerism and emerged as the prominent American religious movement of the Third Wave.

THIRD WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: CHARITY-ORIENTED

Evangelicalism adapted to the self-aggrandizement economics of the 1980s; a primary explanation for its popularity during that decade (Balmer 2004). The emphasis of the dominant individualistic evangelicalism of the Third Wave leaned toward a seductive, commercial gospel in contrast with the social gospel of the Second Wave (Matzat 1995). Kristin (2005) identified a theology of cosmopolitan consumerism within evangelical culture. The consumerism of free market economics that characterized evangelicalism in the Third Wave distinguished it from the struggles for economic justice of the working class of Mainline Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in the Second Wave (1355).

According to a 2006 Time Magazine cover story, 17% of American Christians considered themselves part of the prosperity movement within evangelical Christianity. The prosperity movement emphasized aggressive personal gain as part of God's plan for individual lives; a larger house, more money, and a more expensive car were part of the promises of God (Biema & Chu 2006). The movement did not, however, characterize all evangelicals, though it represented a growing trend of American evangelicalism descent into full-blown American materialism. The prosperity movement was criticized by megachurch pastor Rick Warren. Warren noted:

“When conservative Christianity split from the Mainline in the early 20th century, the latter pursued their commitment to the "social gospel" by working on poverty and other causes such as civil rights and the Vietnam-era peace movement. Evangelicals went the other way: they largely concentrated on issues of individual piety. We took on personal salvation--we need our sins redeemed, and we need our Savior, but some people tended to go too individualistic, and justice and righteousness issues were overlooked” (as reported by Biema & Chu 2006: 3)”.

Adherence to radical capitalistic ideals such as the prosperity movement demonstrated that free market economics characterized Third Wave evangelicalism. Free market economics set the stage for a value of charity over justice. Evangelicals were historically supportive of laissez-faire welfare policies that left the economic fortune of the poor to a morally bracing market discipline (Hick 2006: 507). Hilton (1998) and Waterman (1991) indicated that early Victorian evangelicals and utilitarians converged in a belief in individual economic and moral self-reliance, and a kind of institutional laissez-faire of minimal state relief (Waterman 1991: 148,199). The ideology of self-reliance corresponded with the evangelical notion of “limited institutional mediation of humankind's relation to God” (Hilton 1998: 8-15,pp.34-38). Third Wave consumerism and free market philosophy dictated that the market rewarded the diligent and punished the indolent; a concept that evangelicalism embraced.

There was a causal impact of late nineteenth century Protestant revivalism upon late nineteenth century Republican voting (Thomas 1989: 66-89). The late nineteenth century Evangelicalism was an entrepreneurial middle-class solution to problems of class, legitimacy, and order generated in the early stages of manufacturing (Luebbert 1991: 85). A pragmatic fusion of religious and free market conservatism marked

conservatism in the United States since the 1950s (Diamond 1995). The resurgence of Evangelicalism took an unusual political turn in the 1980s and dominated American politics (Hammond 1985: 53). Since the 1990s, white evangelicals shifted toward laissez-faire views with a simultaneous shift into Republican partisanship (Hick 2006: 506). Republicans historically supported free trade, globalization, and other economic philosophies of the Third Wave. White evangelical membership was increasingly composed of Republican partisans; a party that was increasingly broadly anti-redistributive in ideological and policy-making thrusts regarding socioeconomic issues (Poole & Rosenthal 1997). The alliance between Evangelicalism and the Republican Party demonstrated the ideological fusion of Evangelicalism in the Third Wave.

Consistent with the free market and consumerist ideals of the Third Wave, some early evangelical notions regarding the welfare state included a need for laborers to rely on their own resources and for the nation's governors to hurl away artificial crutches (Mandler 1990: 132-133). Philips (2006) noted that economic conservatism found Evangelicalism appealing because a preoccupation with otherworldly personal salvation turned lower-income persons away from distracting visions of economic and social reform (117); a concern shared by Karl Marx.

According to Green (2004) only 35% of evangelicals identified welfare and poverty issues as the most significant political priority, compared to 46% of Mainline Protestants and 47% of Roman Catholics. Only 43% of evangelicals agreed that tax dollars should be used to fight poverty, compared to 52% of Mainline Protestants and 51% of Roman Catholics. Lack of concern for the welfare state and an embrace of laissez-fair market discipline ideologically fused the evangelical focus on privatized, religiously managed charities (Green 2004: 3).

The 1995 Christian Coalition "Contract with the American Family" called for the enactment of legislation to enhance contributions to private charities as a first step toward transforming the bureaucratic welfare state into a system of private and faith-based compassion charities (as reported by Baltz & Browstein 1996: 281). President of the evangelical ministry, "Focus on the Family", James Dobson, noted that "social liberals have imposed governmental action, supposedly for the best of motives, but it has had devastating effect" (as reported by Somers & Block 2005: 266-277). Both groups preferred more charity offered by faith-based organizations and less governmental mediation in matters of economics and social welfare.

Evangelicalism was characterized by a preference for minimal state mediation in matters of social welfare and a preference to allow the market to discipline and reward. Charity emerged from the values of consumerism and free market ideology, which characterized Third Wave religion. Charitable care for individual needs allowing for market discipline set Evangelicalism apart from the Second Wave emphasis on social justice. Hexham (2003) noted that evangelicals gave more to charity than members of mainline churches. Evangelical charity involved meeting temporary individual needs with the ultimate goal of proselytization. Ultimate reform in deindustrialization or other social problems came, according to evangelical theology, not by challenging social structures, but by making converts. Charity, therefore, was a means by which converts were effectively rescued from the brutal discipline of the free market; not by the state, but by privatized evangelical churches and religious organizations.

THIRD WAVE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES: PIETY-ORIENTED

Individualistic and charity values contributed to the evangelical emphasis on personal piety in the Third Wave. Garvey (1993) suggested that Third Wave evangelicalism was singularly characterized by its emphasis on individualistic piety; in contrast with Second Wave religion, which was characterized by an emphasis on community-oriented activism (23). Underlying evangelical theology was the notion that if enough people were saved, social problems would disappear (Penning & Smidt 2002: 117).

Similar to the earliest formations of the puritan Protestant ethic, evangelicals Colson and Eckerd (1991) called for religious institutions to preach and teach the work ethic, teach vocation as a divine calling, teach ethics and personal responsibility because a free society depended upon a healthy moral consensus. Piety produced effective individuals able to brace market discipline and emerge as productive and prosperous consumers. Colson and Eckerd maintained that to treat disadvantaged men and women as victims rather than morally responsible individuals only reinforced an expectation of failure (Colson and Eckerd 1991: 78). Piety and productivity were thereby tantamount in the Third Wave.

Evangelicals of the Third Wave were not socially active in the same way Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics were socially active in the Second Wave. Thomas (1989) identified a relationship between individualistic religion and individualistic politics. The individualistic emphasis of evangelicalism caused a shift in public concern from that of Second Wave religion. Evangelical appeals in politics were often explicitly moral ones and were often of a popular character with great intensives that reached into the everyday social lives of people (as reported by Mann 1986: 326-328).

Whereas Second Wave religion lobbied for political change in issues of workers' rights, women's rights, and minority rights, Third Wave evangelicalism fought against more personal issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and evolution in public schools. The evangelical emphasis on piety was expressed by Witherington (2005) who recognized that when the Ten Commandments were taken from the public square, evangelicals felt as though their religious identity was stripped (39). Evangelicals saw pietistic social issues as moral crises in the American values system, but Toffler (1994) argued that the religion-based wing of the Republican party, predominantly evangelicals, failed to grasp that the crisis it perceived in the value system reflected the more general crisis of Second Wave civilization as a whole (77). The church as a social structure was of marginal importance to Christians in the Third Wave (Budd & Brimlow 2002: 47). Personal responsibility and piety characterized evangelical attitudes toward the deindustrialization and economic change of the Third Wave.

CONCLUSION

Kurth (1999) noted that "all revolutions disrupt the traditions and customs and threaten security, safety, and identity" (1). America's transition to the Third Wave threatened many economic, social, and religious securities. Without new coalitions and alliances, organized labor, religious institutions, and community groups were

marginalized in an increasingly competitive and individualistic society (Russo & Corbin 1999: 82). The prominence of Evangelicalism in the Third Wave marked new challenges for religious communities confronting the economic and labor issues as they transitioned out of the Second Wave.

Toffler (1994) maintained that free-marketism and “trickle-down twisted into rigid theological dogma” were inadequate responses to the Third Wave. As the American economy transitioned out of the Second Wave and into the Third Wave, the religious community played a strategic role: a shift in economics required a shift in theological perspective to determine how to make a “demassified society moral and fair” (Toffler 1994: 77). The Third Wave, according to Toffler, demassified culture, values, and morality; Second Wave supporters fought to retain or restore the mass society. Third Wave supporters had to discover creative ways to make de-massification work (Toffler 1994: 84). In this ideological struggle, religious communities played a significant role in shaping the Third Wave society and the socioeconomic issues surrounding deindustrialization.

Individuality, charity, and piety, the values of Evangelicalism in the Third Wave, were both shaped by and contributed to the socio-economic climate of Third Wave deindustrialization. However, Colson and Eckerd (1991) asserted that when religion spoke on economic issues it usually missed the central message and focused on politics (94). Evangelicalism largely succumbed to the tendency toward politicization and its values offered little to socioeconomic reform in the face of Third Wave challenges. According to Russo and Corbin (1996), the central question is no longer whether religious communities should respond institutionally, educationally, economically, geographically, and culturally, but rather how social institutions might intervene in more intelligent and supportive ways (82).

The Third Wave is a socioeconomic reality in America. The remnants of the factory labor and domestic manufacturing have become marginalized sectors of the American economy. The challenge that faces the religious communities is not a matter of polarization to the political right or left, to the social gospel or evangelical piety, but to formulate a new comprehensive theology and social action that will the moral crises of the Third Wave transition and future economic shifts. The challenge will be to preserve the dignity of individuals and meet the human needs presented by corporate downsizing while equally challenging corporations and governments to justice. As Novak (1993) suggested, the ethic proper to political economics is an ethic of prudence, suffused with charity, of justice tempered with mercy. The final transition from the Second Wave to the Third Wave requires a calculated religious response of justice and charity, activism and piety, individualism and community.

In the Third Wave the Mainline Protestant denominations, Roman Catholics, and Evangelicals all have the potential to contribute to a unique religious response to the future socioeconomic changes. It will be critical for religious communities to work together based on shared concerns for human life, economic justice, and participation in social and religious institutions (Russo & Corbin 1999: 89) to help the deindustrialized communities recover from economic crises and progress toward brighter economic futures. Such progress will require a radical change in thinking. Perhaps solutions will be found in a “Fourth Wave” socio-religious revolution that challenges both the American economy and religious institutions to engage in mutual transformation.

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Hick 2006

Corbin 1996

Brooks & Manza

Within this work, Native American Religion is described, providing a view of perceptions over a century ago. Below is an edited excerpt from this historical publication. Indian Religion From the Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, by Frederick W. Hodge, 1906. Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. The scope of religious concepts depends, to a certain extent, on the knowledge of the laws of nature; and, since the natural and the supernatural, as conceived in the mind of Native Americans, does not coincide with our view of this subject, there are marked differences in the scope of religion. Native American religion tends to focus around nature. The landscape, animals, plants, and other environmental elements play a major role in the religion of Native Americans. Many of the legends passed down were an attempt to explain events that occurred in nature. Native American religion includes a number of practices, ceremonies, and traditions. These ceremonies may be in honor of a number of events. In the past, Native American religion was not classified as a religion. Their beliefs were not understood and the complexity of their religion was not seen. This was partly the result of not having a written set of guidelines. In the place of preachers and clergymen were shaman and medicine men. These men were sometimes said to communicate with the gods. Clergy Attitudes Toward Deindustrialization: Religion and the Tofflerian Socio-economic Wave Model [Joshua Reichard] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Select the department you want to search in. All Departments Audible Books & Originals Alexa Skills Amazon Devices Amazon Pharmacy Amazon Warehouse Appliances Apps & Games Arts, Crafts & Sewing Automotive Parts & Accessories Baby Beauty & Personal Care Books CDs & Vinyl Cell Phones & Accessories Clothing, Shoes & Jewelry Women Men Girls Boys Baby Amazon Explore Collectibles & Fine Art Computers Courses Credit and Payment Cards Digital Educational Resources Digital Music Electronics Garden & Outdoor Gift Cards Grocery & Gourmet. Native American religions, religious beliefs and sacramental practices of the indigenous peoples of North and South America. Learn more about Native American religions, including the beliefs and practices of various peoples as well as historical changes and current issues. Christopher Jocks Assistant Professor of Native American Studies and Religion, Dartmouth College. Author of numerous studies of Native American religion and culture. See Article History. Know about the Mi'kmaq people's spirituality and religion. A look at Mi'kmaq religion and spirituality. © Open University (A Britannica Publishing Partner) See all videos for this article. Native American religions , religious beliefs and sacramental practices of the indigenous peoples of North and South America .