

## **Immigration Border Control Human Resource Challenges and Opportunities Affecting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Kenya**

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## Abstract

**Background:** Due to porosity of Kenyan borders, terrorist attacks have increased exponentially from 1980 to 2015 especially the recent spate of cross-border terrorist incidences perpetrated by the Al Shabaab terrorist group. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to evaluate the immigration border control human resource challenges and opportunities affecting counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya.

**Findings:** Staffing levels, serving under unequal scheme of service and terms of employment, deployment of officials on personal integrity and competence, taking corruption, familiarity with anticorruption measures, constant surveillance and sharing of intelligence and work environment affect the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies

**Conclusion:** There is need to exploit existing opportunities which includes investing in human resource capacity especially employment and deployment of adequate border control staff based on merit and competence, enhancing of staff welfare, implementing time-tested integrity and anti-corruption measures and active surveillance and sharing of intelligence among cooperating agencies in a timely, effective and efficiency manner.

**Key words:** Counter-terrorism, Human Resource Challenges, Terrorism; Immigration; Border control Management; Counter-terrorism Opportunities

## 1.1 Background

The devastating effects of international terrorism have put pressure on states globally to urgently focus greater attention on improving their border counter-terrorism strategies. Although military defence and economic regulations have traditionally been central border concerns, in many places, states are retooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus to prioritise policing with the objective to deny territorial access to both local and transnational terrorists who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts (Andreas, 2003). Due to exponential increase in international travel, border management systems have to contend with additional risks associated with these movements including mass-casualty terrorist attacks, rising illegal immigration, and human trafficking which have exposed weaknesses in states' ability to manage their borders effectively. As a result, governments have invested heavily in border management frameworks with an aim of facilitating legitimate travel and trade, preventing terrorism and transnational criminal activity as well as reducing illegal migration flows (Collett, 2011).

Due to increased wave of terrorist attacks, many counter terrorism measures such as use of programmed 'smart' cameras, positioning snipers at specific locations, undercover security operatives and multiple checks using different operational methodologies have been implemented with little success (Kalu, 2009). The problem of long, uncontrolled and porous borders pose significant challenge to all African states. The porosity of the borders of most African states make them vulnerable to cross-border smuggling of small arms, precious metals, illegal drugs, movement of currencies and other possible sources of terrorism financing (OSAA, 2003). This raises the odds and provides opportunities for corrupt officials to collude with terrorists, particularly those with responsibility for maritime and land border controls. The UN counter-terrorism strategy highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution no. 1267 has among its priorities the commitment to address underlying conditions conducive to emergence and spread of terrorism and highlights the

importance of development as an important element of global counter-terrorism efforts. However, there is a gap between political goodwill and the strengthening of human resources capacity-internal and external-needed to implement the counter-terrorism strategies effectively. While the African Union wants to be an effective partner in global counter-terrorism, its members such as Kenya, do not have the financial, technical and human resource to enable the organization to meet expectations (OSAA, 2003).

Due to increasing terror attacks and the subsequent transnational activity East Africa, developed countries such as the US government have teamed with regional countries, including Kenya, to boost their capacity in implementing measures for countering violent extremist threats (Ploch, 2010). However, lack of specific counter terrorism measures with a focus on addressing underlying causes of terrorism have resulted in missed opportunities for preventing extremist activities in the region. In Kenya, terror attacks have increased exponentially over the last 5 years which has adversely affected its peace, stability and socio-economic development agenda. Research reveals that the geo-political position of Kenya increases its vulnerability to international terrorist threats and attacks. For instance, the country is surrounded by relatively unstable countries (such as Somalia and South Sudan) both in political and economic spheres. Additionally, being an ally of the United States of America (USA) and Israel in the fight against international terrorism, Kenya has become a target of terrorist threats and attacks (Otiso, 2009).

The failed state of Somalia has been a volatile ground conducive for recruitment, radicalization and training of terrorist masterminds since early 1990's (Masese, 2012). As a result, Kenya's vulnerability to terrorist attacks has worsened with the counter-insurgency pursuit of the Al-shabaab into Somalia since October, 2011. The incidences of terrorist revenge and retaliation have been on the rise. Being the diplomatic and commercial hub of the region, coupled with its long stretch of porous (poorly policed) borders, the infiltration of terrorist elements to attack both Kenyan and foreign interests has been real. Evidence of this reality can be seen in the history of terrorist attacks in Kenya which Miriti (2008) traces to span from the 1980 bombing of the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, claiming sixteen lives and injuring one hundred more; the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi claiming over two hundred lives and injuring many more; the 2002 bombing of an Israeli owned paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa, the attempt to shoot down an Israeli airplane. Others include the terrorist attack at Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013, Mpeketoni terrorist attack at the Kenyan Coast in which over 60 people died, killing of 28 passengers and 38 mine workers in Mandera in 2014 and the killing of 147 student in Garissa University on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015 as well as abduction of tourists, government officials and international aid workers from refugee camps.

These terrorist activities pose adverse effect on Kenya's political, social and economic stability. For instance, international governments have issued travel advisories warning their nationals against travelling to Kenya. Besides the terrorist threats, international governments have warned of violent and sometimes fatal criminal attacks, carjacking, grenade attacks, home invasions, burglaries and kidnappings which can occur at any time in almost all parts of Kenya. It is noted that Kenya, being a regional hub and economic powerhouse bears the brunt of runaway breakdown of security bedeviling some of its neighbours. As a result, strengthening the institutional and technical capacity is not an option but a necessity for Kenya (Wachira, 2013). It is against this background that this

article aims to answer the following research question: To what extent do immigration border control human resource challenges and opportunities affect counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya?

## 1.2 Methods

The study used cross section descriptive design employing quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. It was carried out in Kenya at purposively selected immigration border control stations. 12 out of 26 gazzeted border control stations, immigration regional offices and headquarters were selected for study. The border control stations were selected to represent border control stations prone to terrorist infiltration from the four major immigration regions and two international airports in Kenya as follows: (a) Garissa in the North Eastern Region which represented the border between Kenya and Somalia; (b) Lungalunga, Kilindini, Lamu, and Kiunga in the Coast Region which represented the border between Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia; (c) Busia and Malaba in Western Region which represented the border between Kenya and Uganda; (d) Namanga, Moyale and Nadapal which represented the Nairobi Region and the borders between Kenya, Tanzania Ethiopia and South Sudan; (e) Jomo Kenyatta and Moi international Airports which represented the air borders.

The criteria for selecting the border stations to be included in the study was based on level of human traffick reported, degree of border porosity and the risk of terrorist penetration. Purposive sampling design was used to select the study sites (institutions) because the activities of these institutions are directly linked to immigration border controls and counter-terrorism strategies which are the main focus of this study. Stratified and simple random sampling was used to select the study respondents who included immigration and security officers working at the border control stations. Stratified sampling method was used to constitute two homogeneous strata, that is, one for immigration and another for security officers using a list of all immigration and security officers (including their contact details) working at the border control stations. All the listed officers in each stratum were assigned identification numbers. Simple random sampling using an Excel worksheet was then used to randomly select a sample of 112 security officers and 136 immigration officers. Trained research assistants who were selected based on their education level and experience in social research were guided by the principal researcher to book interview appointments through telephone calls and administer pre-tested survey questionnaires to the study respondents. Phone calls and emails were used to undertake follow ups to help know whether the targeted persons had received the Questionnaire as well as tracking response from them. A total of 18 respondents failed to participate in the study resulting in a total of 230 out of 248 respondents. This translated into 92.7% response rate for the study. Descriptives and tests of independence (chi square) statistics were used to explore the data collected using SPSS software, version 20.

Qualitative methods involved collecting data from desk reviews, key informants and focus group discussion to provide an in-depth understanding of the factual human resource issues affecting counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya. Key informants were purposively selected from individuals in senior management positions who had valuable information/data on the subject matter. These individuals included senior management staff of the Department of Immigration Services, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and Administration Police Rural Board Patrol Unit (APRBPU), academics and counter-terrorism security experts. A total of 26 key informants were interviewed. A total of 3 focus group discussions comprising key personnel working at the selected border control stations were also done to help gain an in-depth

understanding of the issues raised in the study. The focus group discussions comprised 6-12 participants (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). In addition, an extensive and comprehensive desk review of key documents relating to counter-terrorism on border management were retrieved and reviewed from: Department of Immigration Services, terrorism reports from the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), journals, government periodicals, statistical abstracts, books, and newspaper reports. Qualitative data collected was used to enrich and explore the issues raised in the study, validate and inform discussions of the study findings.

### **1.3 Results**

Table 1 presents findings on staffing, integrity, corruption and data management challenges and opportunities facing counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya while Table 2 presents findings on challenges relating to work environment. The effects of these challenges are summarized in Table 3 which presents Chi square tests of associations for each of the studied variable.

In terms of staffing, 87.8% of the respondents said they were inadequately staffed. 90% of the respondents reported existence of unequal scheme of service and terms of employment among different agencies manning Kenya's immigration border control stations. 82.2% of the respondents said that serving under unequal scheme of service and terms of employment affects their work morale. In terms of work environment, 67% of the respondents said that they did not have decent housing. 58% said that the working environment was uncondusive for effective and efficient discharge of their duties. 44% of the respondents said that there was no adequate security in their work stations. Close to three-quarters (72%) of the respondents said their remuneration was not attractive.

Further, 37% of the respondents said that they were not provided with training which are relevant to their job. 36% of respondents said they had sufficient working tools. 62% of the respondents said they had not been provided with adequate utilities (water, sanitation and electricity) in their respective stations. 42% said they were provided with reliable means of transport at their border controls stations. 33.9% said that staff promotions are not based on merit. 39% of the respondents said there was no objective performance appraisal in their respective stations. 62% of the respondents said that disciplinary recommendations are not acted upon with an equal proportion 62% of respondents indicating absence of rational and regular staff rotation in their work place.

In terms of integrity and ethics, 84% of respondents said that there was no integrity testing conducted in their border control stations. 51% of the respondents were not familiar with any integrity testing Programme. 81% of the respondents were familiar with the provisions of chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya on leadership and integrity. 57% of the respondents rated their knowledge on chapter six of the contitution regarding integrity and leadership above average. 74.6% of the respondents termed the integrity of their security counterparts charged with manning border controls and other immigration check points in their own jurisdiction to be above average. However, 87% of the respondents said that border control officials were not recruited, selected and deployed on the basis of personal integrity, competence and suitability.

In terms of corruption, 91% of the respondents said that transnational criminals bribe border control stations officials to gain entry into Kenya. 32% of the respondents cited corruption to be rampant in immigration border control stations. Further, 90% of the respondents said that anti-corruption

measures were ineffective in their work stations. In relation to data management, 90% of the respondents said that data collection, storage, analysis and dissemination play an important role in border management. 83% of the respondents said that they collected data on passengers' movements. However, 57.8% said that data collected and analysed is not used in monitoring criminal trends, terrorists and mitigation measures.

Results of Chi square test of association showed that staffing levels, serving under unequal scheme of service and terms of employment, deployment of officials on personal integrity, competence and suitability, taking bribes, familiarity with anti-corruption measures, adequate data collection, storage and analysis on passengers movement, provision of decent working environment, attractive remuneration of the staff, provision of relevant training, water, adequate sanitation and electricity, reliable means of transport, adequate security, sufficient working tools, conducting regular promotion based on merit, undertaking objective staff performance appraisal, acting on disciplinary recommendations and undertaking rational and regular staff rotation affects the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies ( $P < 0.05$ ). However, conducting integrity test in border control stations and having knowledge on provision of chapter six (integrity and leadership) of the Constitution of Kenya had no effect on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies ( $P > 0.05$ ).

#### **1.4 Discussion**

Adequate staffing is an important element in the fight against terror. When staff in the same category work under fairly comparable scheme of service, their work morale and motivation are boosted. Unequal scheme of service and terms of employment draw a divide among the different agencies working at the various immigration border control stations. Individuals with poor scheme of service feel discriminated against and unfairly compensated which tempts them to engage in malpractices which can give criminals including terrorist a leeway to exploit. As a result, staffing border control stations with de-motivated staff create an opportunity for disgruntled personnel to engage in unethical and corrupt practices as a way of expressing their frustration and or topping up their income. This compromises the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts. This is supported by a findings from a past study (Otiso, 2009), which reported poor policing capacity of the vast Kenya border to increase risk of maturing terror threats perpetrated along its border line.

Although Kenya is surrounded by unstable countries like Somalia and South Sudan, there are few border control stations due to understaffing among immigration and security officers. The presence of transnational border communities owing strict loyalty to each other and the inadequate number of officers manning them has increased the porosity of Kenya border lines. For instance, the 682km poorly policed Kenya-Somalia border provides an easy entry way for foreigners, some of whom are hostile to both Kenya and the neighbouring states. This has led to increased number of illegal immigrants who have continued to create terror risks within the Kenyan territory.

There is limited capacity of the relevant institutions to cope with high human traffic at the border points which has created gaps/ lapses which the illegal immigrants have used to access Kenyan territories. This is worsened by the vast distance from one border control to another resulting in infrequent or no patrols/ security checks. The result is that borderlines have remained highly vulnerable for extremist groups to enter Kenya especially from surrounding and unstable countries like Somalia and South Sudan.

The nature of working environment has been associated with ability of an individual to execute assigned responsibilities as well as meet set targets. Where the working environment is not conducive, the staff get demoralized and de-motivated resulting in poor work outputs. Ensuring that staff are motivated, by providing essential services and programmes which make them feel appreciated and valued in an organization, challenges them to identify with the objectives of the organization. This creates congruence between staff objectives and organization objectives which leads to synergy for high performance to reduce security lapses within the border control stations and rural borderline. Additionally, existence of such de-motivation and discouragement provides incentives for staff to enter into compromising deals for their security and protection which has led to corrupt practices. Lack of adequate and more advanced work tools and equipment for use in the course of their duties relative to criminal groups limit ability of the personnel to adequately fight against such groups. This has been cited as a key cause of delayed security responses during emergency calls to subdue terrorists. Security officers manning the Kenyan borders have insufficient facilities to facilitate their movement and communication when dealing with terror threats. Resultantly, when responding to terrorist attacks, in which terrorists are said to have more sophisticated facilities, some officers end up losing their lives .

Failure to provide adequate welfare for the staff not only makes fear a constant daily life but also provides a breeding ground for some of the staff to become accomplices of criminal activities and terror as well as a reason for increasing incidences of linkage of government staff to terrorist activities. This makes the fight against terrorism difficult for the government because the counter-terrorism strategies are fought both from outside and from within the same institution charged with mandate of ensuring there is sufficient security and prevention of terrorists from entering the country.

Security and community intelligence partnership is important. Sensitizing border communities on key partnership areas such as the kind of information they should be giving to facilitate counter-terrorism efforts at the local level is also a vital element in the fight against terrorism and extremists. This is important based on the fact that many terrorists, who attack the country, enter and live with the community, planning their attack for a long time before the right time comes for them to strike. Therefore, there is need for cooperation between the community and security agencies which can be boosted through community involvement in border counter-terrorism planning especially by effective and efficient communication and exchange of relevant information with the communities. This will help to monitor and report illegal activities to the authorities on the extensive porous frontiers that are not effectively policed by government officials. Perhaps this is what the government of Kenya is aiming to initiate in the “*nyumba kumi*” or ten household concepts being planned as response to the 21<sup>st</sup> September 2013 Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, which costed Kenya over 67 lives and 175 injuries.

Further, a number of terrorism activities in Kenya and within the region have been blamed on corruption involving the government officials, extremist groups and cartels organized to facilitate the extremist activities. Corruption and terrorism have been cited to go together. Corruption acts have facilitated influx of terrorism groups/individuals and thriving of terrorism in Kenya as supported by Orttung (2009) who observed that poor governance creates a favorable environment for thriving of terrorism and terrorist activities by facilitating their ability to attack or organize. Terrorists corrupt government officials to gain entry into Kenya so as to execute their operations fueled by their individual interests emanating from their affiliate groups/organizations with vested

interests such as revenge and or as an act of national, regional or international recognition. Thus, the high corruption incidences have a direct relationship to terrorism acts perpetrated across and along the border points.

The weak efforts by the Kenyan Government on implementation of the existing laws, ethical and anti-corruption measures have also enabled corruption to thrive and water down efforts geared towards counter-terrorism efforts especially along Kenya border points. This has demoralized efforts of other committed personnel to scale up their fight against insurgency and related extremist activities especially those resulting from illegal immigrants and suspected terrorists. In addition, lack of integrity among border management institutions has created a formidable challenge in the fight against terrorism perpetrated along the Kenyan borders. This has put into question the commitment of the government in enhancing security in Kenya to an extent of drawing both local and international criticism.

In line with results of a past study by Orttung (2013), the high incidence of porosity resulting from corruption practices among security agents and other staff operating in these border control station has been linked to greed for money and or feeling of vulnerability to criminal group threats. In addition, use of repressive methods in fighting terrorism and illegal immigrants has prompted immigrants and individuals feeling discriminated against and oppressed to seek out criminal and shadow structures instead of appealing to government agencies and law-enforcement for support. Such individuals provide the support the criminal groups require to succeed through corruption and unethical practices outside the knowledge of the security agents and institution as a way of sympathizing and revenging. As such, terrorism is facilitated through well formulated and executed architecture of colluding cartels within the same institutions mandated to prevent such deals and activities. This conflict of interest has made it difficult for the counter-terrorism strategies to be adequately successful in ensuring security of the country.

This finding is also supported by similar study by Robinson (1999) who found out that the enormous amount of money that terrorists are able to launder, to re-invest in criminal activity, to hand out as bribes to the border control and law enforcement security officials and to accumulate profits can replace the government with a body politic designed in their own image. Therefore, without collusion of terrorist groups with prominent leaders and officials in key institutions such as banks, security and immigration institutions, terrorist groups cannot function on a national and global basis as successfully as they do. This violates the constitution of Kenya (2010) requirements of integrity among the state officers in the execution of their duties.

To succeed in the fight against terrorism, constant surveillance, data collection, processing and sharing of information is fundamental in monitoring and weeding out criminals posing threats to national security. Similar to findings by Adamson (2006), lack of effective and efficient intelligence gathering and sharing among the relevant cooperating agencies has compromised counter-terrorism efforts aimed at denying terrorist access to Kenya. Intelligence gathered provides a cornerstone in fighting terrorist attacks in any state without which terrorism and related criminal activities cannot be contained. This concurs with the Kenyan situation where many attacks have been blamed on the immigrants who penetrate Kenyan borders and live in Kenya illegally without the knowledge of government officials. These terrorist groups radicalize and recruit the young people to join illegal militia groups who later carry out attacks within the country with the help of networks across the border with the terrorists. Therefore, intelligence data should not only be specifically reliable and available but also timely and updated to facilitate execution of counter-terrorism strategies before

terrorists can act. However, in many circumstances, such data are either too general, unavailable, or not shared among the relevant recipients. This situation is worsened by inadequacy of comprehensive patrol and patrol equipment provided in order to execute swiftly criminal surveillance and tracking with the data collected in a timely manner.

One identifiable factor vis-à-vis a state's likelihood of experiencing terrorist attacks involves a state's own prevention tactics – or lack thereof which hangs on the level and reliability of available and shared intelligence. How bureaucratic a state's information-gathering system is affects the likelihood of materialized terror attacks. If a state is highly bureaucratic and has many levels of information existing separately within various organizations, it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that each entity is operating in a capacity that would allow it to effectively curb terrorism. Similar to findings by Flynn (2002), separate information held by the state agencies responsible for prevention of terror attacks such as immigration and security institution affects counter-terrorism abilities. Many of the attacks in Kenya could have been potentially prevented if the separate information available was shared between cooperating agencies. Such information is fundamental in monitoring, tracking and intercepting criminals including terrorist's trends and mitigation measures taken. Streamlining the process to allow shared information and equal access to important details is crucial in gaining a clearer understanding of the threats a state faces for effective planning and response strategies. Without access and sharing of such vital information among key and cooperating agencies/departments, the country is bound to waste time and money, miss potential key clues on escalating terrorist risks more than in the past.

### **1.5 Conclusion**

Kenya faces substantial immigration border control human resource challenges in its efforts to address terrorism and terror threats along and within its border line. This requires concerted efforts to address the root cause of terrorism other than its symptoms. Inadequate staffing levels, poor working environment, corruption and bureaucratic intelligence surveillance and sharing among security agencies and institutions increases porosity of Kenyan border line to increasing terror attacks and extremist activities. There is need to develop and implement successful staff welfare programmes to ensure that work environment is conducive for discharge of border control daily duties. This should be enhanced by use of scheme of service and employment terms to reduce corruption, unethical practices and demotivation which creates leeways and loopholes for collusion between security personnel and terrorists. Further, comprehensive and contextualized integrity testing and anti-corruption programmes should be implemented to curb corruption supported by using comprehensive systems audit, public education, integrity testing programme and sting operation at all immigration border control stations. This requires partnership and collaboration with independent parties such as Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission. Finally, sufficient, time-tested measures for timely and reliable intelligence gathering and sharing among partnering and cooperating agencies should be implemented to deny terrorists the resources they need to thrive.

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**Tables**

Table 1 Staffing, integrity, corruption and data management challenges

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>n=230</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Is staffing levels sufficient in your work station	Yes	202	87.8
	No	28	12.2
Do you serve under equal Scheme of service and terms of employment	Yes	23	10
	No	207	90
Are you familiar with any integrity testing Programmeme	Yes	112	48.7
	No	118	51.3
Has integrity testing been conducted in your work station	Yes	38	16.5
	No	192	83.5
Are you familiar with provision of integrity and leadership in chapter six of constitution of Kenya	Yes	187	81.3
	No	43	18.7
Rate your knowledge on provision of integrity and leadership in chapter six of constitution of Kenya	Excellent	56	24.3
	Very good	76	33
	Good	83	36.1
	Very poor	15	6.5
Rate integrity of your security counterparts	Very high	20	8.7
	High	67	29.1
	Moderate	87	37.8
	Low	37	16.1
	Very Low	19	8.3
Is recruitment done on the basis of personal integrity and suitability	Yes	29	12.6
	No	201	87.4
Is there cases of illegal immigrants bribing border officials to gain entry into Kenya	Yes	209	90.9
	No	21	9.1
Corruption responsible for spate of terrorism	Yes	103	44.8
	No	127	55.2
Any anti-corruption measures in the station	Yes	24	10.4
	No	206	89.6
Data collection, storage and analysis dissemination important	Yes	206	89.6
	No	24	10.4
Collect any data on passenger movement in your station	Yes	203	88.3
	No	27	11.7
Data Collection means	Electronically	94	40.9
	Manually	84	36.5
	Both	52	22.6

Table 2: Working environment challenges

Variable	Agree		Neutral		Disagree	
	n	%	n	%	N	%
Provides decent housing	54	23.5	23	10	153	66.5
Working environment is conducive	51	22.2	46	20	133	57.8
There is adequate security	83	36.1	47	20.4	100	43.5
There is attractive remuneration	34	14.8	31	13.5	165	71.7
Training is relevant to my job	86	37.4	44	19.1	100	43.5
There are sufficient working tools	82	35.7	46	20	102	44.3
There is adequate water, sanitation and electricity	47	20.4	40	17.4	143	62.2
There is reliable means of transport	97	42.2	67	29.1	66	28.7
Promotion is done on merit	94	40.9	58	25.2	78	33.9
There is objective staff performance appraisal	90	39.1	62	27	78	33.9
Disciplinary recommendations are acted upon	48	20.9	39	17	143	62.2
There is rational and regular staff rotation	47	20.4	41	17.8	142	61.7

Table 3: Effects of human resource challenges on effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies

Variable	$X^2$	df	P-Value
<b>Staffing</b>			
Staffing Level	5.038	1	0.025*
Unequal scheme of service effect	5.639	1	0.018*
<b>Corruption and integrity</b>			
Familiar with integrity testing Programme conducted by EACC	2.922	1	0.087
Conducting of Integrity tests	0.126	1	0.723
Effective Integrity testing Programme effectiveness	11.343	3	0.010*
Familiar with chapter 6 of Kenya Constitution	2.632	1	0.105
Knowledge on Chapter 6 of Kenya Constitution	1.016	3	0.797
Integrity of security counterparts	4.089	4	0.394
Officials deployed on personal integrity, competence and suitability	5.461	1	0.019*
Illegal immigrants Bribe border officials	9.14	1	<b>0.003</b> *
Corruption incidences in stations	20.395	4	<b>0.000</b> *
Corruption responsible for spate of terrorism	2.546	1	0.111
Anticorruption measures in stations	59.03	1	<b>0.000</b> *
<b>Work Environment</b>			
Employer provides decent housing	3.655	4	0.455
Employer provides decent working environment	13.061	4	<b>0.011</b> *
Employer provides adequate security	15.534	4	<b>0.004</b> *
Employer provides attractive remuneration	13.824	4	<b>0.008</b> *
Employer provides relevant training	17.417	4	<b>0.002</b> *
Employer provides sufficient working tools	18.914	4	<b>0.001</b> *
Employer provides water, sanitation and electricity	11.817	4	<b>0.019</b> *
Employer provides reliable means of transport	18.938	4	<b>0.001</b> *
Employer conducts regular promotion on merit	10.573	4	<b>0.032</b> *
Employer undertakes objective staff performance appraisal	10.198	4	<b>0.037</b> *
Employers acts on disciplinary recommendations	10.781	4	<b>0.029</b> *
Employer undertakes rational and regular staff rotation	10.488	4	<b>0.033</b> *
<b>Data management and intelligence sharing</b>			
Data processing important	59.03	1	<b>0.000</b> *
Data collection and sharing on passenger movement	6.776	1	<b>0.009</b> *
Means of data collection	2.385	2	0.303

In Kenya, data on migration is regularly collected and analysed by government institutions. Some of the data is available to the public through monthly and annual reports, while the majority is for internal use by the institution producing the data. The migration profiling exercise and associated capacity-building efforts are meant to increase the analysis, sharing and dissemination of migration data in Kenya. Migration policymaking is a key priority area in public administration. As migration has a direct impact on individual well-being and state welfare, it is increasingly a factor being con The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC), initially established in the Department of Political Affairs, were moved into the UNOCT for greater coherence. Expectations were further raised by the promise that the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate's expert assessments in technical assistance and capacity building would be made more widely available to benefit member states, donors, and recipients. It included concerns about failure to adequately address the human rights abuses being committed, and the increasing erosion of international humanitarian law in the name of combatting terrorism. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat in all its forms and manifestations with determination and in full solidarity. NATO's Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement. Counter terrorism and radicalisation. The European Union aims to be an area of freedom, security and justice, without internal frontiers. Europeans should feel confident that wherever they move within the EU, their freedom and their security are well protected. One of the main threats to those aims is terrorism. Combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility. EU countries have the front-line responsibility for security, yet EU cooperation is essential to fight terrorism. The Strategy announces the adoption of a Counter Terrorism Agenda for the EU, together with renewed action to prevent and counter radicalisation. 2017: Directive on combating terrorism. On 15 March 2017, the EU adopted the Directive on combating terrorism.