
Introduction: Blowing Up the “Bridge”

Dušan I. Bjelić

During the summer of 2000 we (students from Serbian universities, representatives of various Serbian NGOs, and two professors from a U.S. university) sat in a small restaurant in Vladičin Han, on the border of Serbia and Macedonia. We were having lunch on our way to Macedonia for a meeting with students from Priština University, an event organized by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. As we were being served beverages, a bearded multilingual Orthodox monk, his black robes marked by the Greek Orthodox insignia, approached our table apparently intrigued to hear Professor Lucinda Cole speaking English. In Oxford English he introduced himself as Petar; we offered him a seat. After a series of tense exchanges on Madeline Albright’s “Jewish conspiracy” against the Serbs (at this point he identified himself as a Serb), on why the Roma should not be allowed to form their own church, on the general idea of multiculturalism, the conversation (for reasons now impossible to reconstruct) turned to Margaret Mitchell’s *Gone with the Wind*. It turned out that the monk, who by that time had succeeded—in spite of his pious voice—to insult the political sensibilities of just about everybody on the terrace, had read the novel at least seven times. He proceeded to quote entire passages in a passionately romantic tone, and to express very strong opinions on why Scarlett O’Hara married her first husband, whose name he nevertheless misremembered. “Charles!” a young, pierced and tattooed representative of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee corrected, loudly and somewhat testily, from another table. The entire terrace—which unbeknownst to us, had been listening to this conversation in English—laughed, and soon enough a chorus of voices offered opinions about Scarlett’s behavior and about whether or not she “truly” loved Rhett Butler. The editor of *The Belgrade Circle Journal* suggested, jokingly, that instead of focusing on Serb-Albanian relations, we should organize a conference on the socio-political impact of *Gone with the Wind*.

We laughed, too, but in retrospect this moment seems emblematic, and not only because prior to that point we had no idea how many in our radically diverse group spoke English. Clearly, what prompted the conversation across religious, political, gender, and ethnic lines was an *investment* in the relationship between Rhett Butler and Scarlett O’Hara—an identification, that is, with some aspect of this especially powerful American narrative of heterosexual romance. It was no accident, in other words, that a “trans-ethnic” Orthodox monk, an American post-structuralist feminist, two anti-nationalist Serbs, a Rom activist, a Communist feminist, and dozens of other participants were able to argue about Scarlett O’Hara’s love life. Through the bourgeois romance-narrative, race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and other markers of difference were temporarily occluded. *Gone with the Wind* appeared to offer a momentary release, on this terrace in Vladičin Han, from the imperatives of differences, and a momentary escape into the pleasures of a heterosexual love story. The obvious *jouissance* of self-commodification in the Eastern Orthodox monk’s sentiments shocked yet challenged our stereotypes. The monk, who had trained in the ascetic disciplines of the desert fathers, appeared to contradict Fredric Jameson’s orientaling claim that East wishes to talk only in terms of “power and oppression” while “the West in terms of culture and commodification.”¹ In retrospect, however, the monk had taught us an important lesson, of how those discourses which insist exclusively on “society as a whole,” are bogus in the face of the concreteness of a life in crisis. Appreciating Terry Eagleton’s observation about the diminished theoretical relevance of such discourses to “an irritating habit of existing,”² today we wonder whether or not Jameson’s “hearing aid got switched off”³ when he made his claim, glossing over the important fact, for example, that in both the United States and the Balkans the tradition of heterosexuality and of ethnic differentiation are historically linked, fusing procreation with nation, kin with territory, sexual pleasure with ethnic exclusion, with fratricide, and with rape.

The episode at Vladičin Han, we think, succinctly introduces the topic of this volume: Balkan identity and representation, its pleasures and its violence. Though the Balkans and the American South have very different histories, neither history can be understood without recognizing the impact of a colonialism that helped shape both regions’ cultures, identities, and corresponding regimes of signification. In *Gone with the Wind*, a binary logic constructs the category of “Whiteness” as being parasitic on “Blackness.”⁴ Similarly, among nationalistic Serbs, the category “the Serbs” is parasitically dependent on the category “Albanians.” The Balkans and the American South are constructed through a discourse that associates modernity

and progress, however arbitrarily, with “the West” in the one instance, and “the North” in the other. Consequently, their identities are structured in relation to a spatio-political order that arrives from the “outside.” The Balkans serve much the same function for global politics that the American South serves for the American national one. Whereas “the South” has traditionally been viewed as a backward, seething pit of racial and sexual violence against which the liberal and enlightened North defines itself, “the Balkans” have functioned as the fulcrum for Enlightenment Europe’s self-image, or the means by which “progressive” Europe projects its anxieties and forbidden desires onto the other, as if onto “Cat People,” that is, or onto those who constitute its antithetical periphery. In this sense, we can speak of an organized system of knowledge akin to what Edward Said has called *Orientalism*.

Like *Orientalism*, *Balkanism* has been organized around a sense of binaries (rational/irrational, center/periphery, civilization/barbarism) arranged hierarchically so that the first sign (“Whiteness” or “Europe”), is always primary and definitional of the second (“Blackness” or “Balkans”), and so that the second is always a grammatical, internal effect of the first. For example, “Byzantium” (referring to the Byzantine church) is not represented today in the same way as Protestantism and Catholicism—that is, in terms of what it meant to the members of that religion, the Byzantines—but rather in terms of what it meant to Protestants and Catholics. In “What is so Byzantine about the Balkans?” Milica Bakić-Hayden summarizes the binary logic of Western discourse on Byzantium, whereby Byzantium becomes marked as “authoritarian” or “crypto-nationalist,” “corrupted” by a “convoluted politics” that is “cesaropapistic.”⁵ The question that remains, however, is whether or not *every* system of colonial representation based on binaries is by definition *Orientalism* or, more importantly, are the binaries of Said’s *Orientalism* good for the marginals and outsiders?

Is *Balkanism* a Subsidiary of *Orientalism*?

Although influenced by Said’s work, the Balkan scholars represented in this volume cherish Said’s political humanism and would agree with Gayatri Spivak that Said’s *Orientalism* “blossomed into a garden where the marginal can speak and be spoken, even spoken for.”⁶ Yet Balkan scholars would insist, however, that *Balkanism* is not a subspecies of *Orientalism*, but has its own unique properties, responding to rules that marginalized minority speech. Balkan scholars were not the first to develop a critique of *Orientalism*, but they contributed a unique host of arguments specific to their discursive locality.

In the middle of the nineties, Balkan scholars began to produce groundbreaking work in the English speaking world. Maria Todorova's seminal book *Imagining the Balkans*,⁷ Vesna Goldsworthy's *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination*,⁸ Stathis Gourgouris *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*,⁹ and Milica Bakić-Hayden's "Nesting Orientalism,"¹⁰ to mention just a few, have established Balkanism as a critical study of colonial representation distinctly different from *Orientalism*. Rather than representing the Balkans substantively, either as a geopolitical place or as a people with a "collective paranoia," these authors began to represent the Balkans as a "place" in a *discourse-geography*. That is, as the object of a coherent body of knowledge—*Balkanism*. Thus instead of telling us what the Balkans *are*, they diverted the question of the Balkans into the problem of imperial language. They asked, "how do we know what we know about the Balkans?" Without denying overlaps with *Orientalism*, the Balkan scholar insists that *Balkanism* has different representational mechanisms. While Said argues that the East/West Orientalist binary refers to a "project rather than a 'place,'" Bakić-Hayden claims that, in the former Yugoslavia, *Orientalism* is a *subjectivational practice* by which all ethnic groups define the "other" as the "East" of them;¹¹ in so doing, they not only orientalize the "other," but also occidentalize themselves as the West of the "other."

Indeed, postcolonial analysts noticed before Bakić-Hayden that pejorative stereotypes were strategically available not only to the empire, but also distributed among colonial subjects. Richard G. Fox demonstrates how Mahatma Gandhi utilized, for the purpose of anticolonial struggle, "Orientalist images of India as inherently spiritual, consensual, and corporate."¹² But while Gandhi and the Hindi internalized Orientalized stereotypes to resist their colonial identifications, something else happened in the Balkans, where people subverted their own identities by orientalizing one another.

These "nesting Orientalisms" seem to be as old as the split of the Christian Church. The Orthodox Church always presented itself as the West; that is, as part of Christendom in relation to the Islamic East. But in relation to Roman Catholicism, the Orthodoxy presented itself as rooted in the monastic East. Thus, *Balkanism*, Todorova maintains, must be evaluated in the light of *Occidentalism* as well—a discourse on the West's self-essentialization.¹³ There are two reasons for this: first because the West's essentializing scheme of being the "opposite" to the "Orient" operates as a benchmark for "nesting-Orientalisms"; second because in inventing *Balkanism* as a discourse on the "opposite," the West essentializes Balkan

identity. *Balkanism*, then, meanders between *Orientalism* and *Occidentalism*, once as a representational mechanism, again as a *subjectivational* process.

It should be clarified that the word *Balkanism* has changeable meanings. Sometimes it refers to the body of knowledge about the Balkans, and sometimes to the critical study of this very discourse. *Balkanism* in the first sense delivers substantive knowledge about the Balkans without examining the presuppositions upon which this knowledge has been generated—Robert D. Kaplan’s book *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* is a prime example. *Balkanism* in the second sense examines the Balkans in relation to suppositions constitutive of *Balkanism* in the first sense—that is, as an epistemology. Maria Todorova’s book, *Imagining the Balkans*, illustrates this approach.

K. E. Fleming’s excellent paper “*Orientalism*, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography” elucidates the above differences. Fleming maintains that to the extent that *Balkanism* creates a single popular image of the Balkans, which then becomes a matrix for all other representations of the Balkans, it resembles *Orientalism*. However, Said’s *Orientalism*, and Balkan scholars’ critique of *Balkanism*, significantly differ in theory and method. For Said, *Orientalism* “was meant to be a study in critique, not an affirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical identities”¹⁴—a way of setting the stage for peaceful coexistence by dismantling differences in part by accepting the universal critique of the Western essence. *Balkanism*, in contrast, affirms constitutive differences and paradoxes for the sake of the Balkan’s representational concreteness. This affirmation is the key to both the method and the cultural mission of *Balkanism*. Having said that, however, we do not mean to suggest that the *political goals* of *Balkanism* differ from Said’s aspirations for multicultural coexistence. Rather, we are suggesting that especially for *Balkanism*, the political may also be in the method of representation, rather than in its content. Said hoped that if a discourse could eliminate differences, political reality would follow that discourse. But Balkan scholars have long recognized that though differentiation is a universal principle of domination, it does not make all differentiation the same. In other words, political differentiation and methodological differentiation for the Balkans are different operations. This is an important point of distinction, especially since the Balkans have all too often been confused with other parts of Eastern Europe: for example, before the introduction of automatic dialing, U.S. phone operators would often connect to Czechoslovakia when asked for Yugoslavia. Similarly, it is not unusual even for American academics to confuse the Balkans with the Baltics, or Slovenia with Slovakia. The editors of the book in which Slovenian philosopher

Slavoj Žižek's article "Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself!" was recently published, described him as a "Slovakian social theorist and psychoanalyst."¹⁵

Before addressing internal differences, then, Balkan scholars often stress a politics of signification, one of whose effects has been to erase a specific place, body, or history. The lack of differentiation in Said's *Orientalism* prompted Arif Dirlik to insist, like Todorova, on a full restoration of "historicity informed by the complexity of everyday life, one which accounts not only for what unites, but more importantly, for those diversities in space and time which are as undesirable to national power as to Eurocentrism."¹⁶ It is precisely this lack of differentiation that jeopardizes the most vital aspect of Said's work, giving the voice to minorities, because as Bart Moore-Gilbert observes, Said's rush to unify the world under the common culture "may equally well confirm, or even engender, a whole series of margins and outsiders."¹⁷

What then is Balkan specificity? What were the historic contingencies engendering the Balkan specificities? Is this specificity in the nature of empirical evidence or of logical paradox? The Balkan scholars in this volume agree that the latter is the case. Historically, the paradox may be explained, by acknowledging that the Balkan region was never colonized in the modern sense, as the Orient was, despite being subjected to Ottoman rule. Rather than exploiting natural resources and human labor, the Ottoman Empire, Fleming reminds us, introduced policies of re-population, coupled with policies of religious conversion and polarization, underwritten by perennial military campaigns. Thus Balkan people perceived each other as both colonial rulers *and* as colonial subjects. Serbian nationalism, for example, both celebrates its medieval empire and remembers Ottoman slavery, a dual sensitivity which then gets translated into calling Bosnian Muslims "Turks"—that is, the colonizers—even while claiming Kosovo as an important part of the Serbian Empire. Whether Balkan nationalism is post-imperial or post-colonial, it is fair to say that it remains distinctly liminal.

The Balkans as a *Discursive Geography* and a Method for Liminal Space

In the critique of *Balkanism*, the Balkans gain specificity by virtue of this liminal status, of being neither here nor there, but in two places at the same time. Many scholars share a tacit understanding that, for outsiders, the Balkans "cannot be told apart or put together," which ultimately causes Balkan differences to melt into sameness. However, this Balkanist presupposition may also be turned into a heuristic device for concretizing the Balkans. As Fleming observes, discourse on the Balkans is one both of "sameness and of difference."¹⁸ This liminal status must

contribute not only to Balkan identity, but also to how we resist the representational stability that *Balkanism* implies. To this end, Fleming observes, “The Balkans’ liminal status—at the interstices between worlds, histories, and continents—is tantamount not so much to marginality as to a sort of centrality.”¹⁹ This centrality has two consequences: First, the Balkans may reclaim their representational concreteness; second, the Balkans may be known through what Michel Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges.” According to Foucault’s notion of power and domination, knowledge of certain specific places, bodies, and histories is concealed and subjugated because such entities resist the discourse of universal rationality—indeed, their incorporation into that discourse would rupture it. Here another paradox of the Balkans looms. The intense internal polarities created by *Balkanism*’s binary logic (Christianity/Islam, civilization/barbarism, etc.) infuses any reality imposed upon the Balkans by *Balkanism* with pernicious instability.

Another, no less important difference between *Orientalism* and *Balkanism*, Fleming insists, is the different institutional organization of these two knowledges. While *Orientalism* involves a long tradition of academic and “expert” knowledge, the same cannot be said for *Balkanism*. There is nothing comparable in *Balkanism* to the Napoleonic survey of Egypt; *Balkanism* traditionally consisted of travelogues, journalistic accounts, and occasional history books. Only very recently, with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, was “expert” knowledge introduced in *Balkanism*. Even this expertise is less related to academia than it is to journalism, diplomacy, and international law. Only a very small group of Western scholars are dedicated to Balkan studies. In contrast to *Orientalism* and its critical study, which originated in Western centers of knowledge, *Balkanism* and its study are primarily concentrated in the Balkans.²⁰ In this respect, *Balkanisms* are an intellectual export industry of the Balkans.

Although they agree on the general contours of *Balkanism*, Balkan scholars disagree on the proper methodology for its critical analysis. Unlike Said’s *Orientalism*, which brackets the question of the Orient’s historical concreteness in order to describe *orientalist* constructions, *Balkanism* as a critical study is a system of representation based on the historical perception of the Balkans by colonial rulers. These perceptions took root as schemes of self-recognition for Balkan peoples, so their study must be based on historical as well as discursive analysis. The very terms “Balkan” and “Balkanism,” as Todorova convincingly argues, cannot be divorced from the history of the place.

Few scholars of the Balkans can ignore Todorova’s work. But how can Balkan people account for their history if their history is also their personal tragedy, and

the Balkans the site of their trauma? Petar Ramadanović takes up this issue in “Simonides of the Balkans,” demonstrating the gulf between participants’ and onlookers’ accounts of war, and the contingent nature of memory. Ramadanović compares a recent attempt by an ex-Yugoslavian poet and writer, Dubravka Ugrešić, to compare the legend of Simonides, in the context of the Yugoslavian wars, with a Western journalist’s accounts of the siege of Sarajevo, underscoring that both attempts fail to tell what actually happened, and may even create the narrative conditions for a new catastrophe.

Considering the claim that language is not a medium for transmitting information, but a mechanism for producing order, Ramadanović’s essay brings to our attention the traumatic status of Balkan languages and their failures to recreate the past in a rational and stable fashion. An epistemological obstacle for a rational discourse, trauma is utilized most effectively by the ideological discourses for the production of reality. Always traumatic and unstable, Balkan reality invites discourses of domination. Bearing this in mind, Rastko Močnik, in his essay “The Balkans’ as an Element in an Ideological Mechanism,” accuses Todorova of falling into an empiricist bias by analyzing the Balkans only in terms of an “Ottoman legacy,” and failing to fully account for the status and function of *Balkanism* within the context of an ideology of globalization. Močnik meanwhile insists that an a priori analysis of power relations may be necessary not only to explain the formation of Balkan representations but also to provide a nonbiased direction for empirical studies. He extrapolates from the public discourse on the Balkans two major a priori structures of domination and subordination that govern conceptual formations: first, a *horizontal* antagonism between the Balkan states and ethnic groups, in which each of them is a potential aggressor; secondly, a *vertical* system of co-operation between each of these parties and the European Union. Within this asymmetrical system of *antagonisms* and *co-operation*, stereotypes of Balkan character emerge as “knowledge” and as identities. Unlike Todorova, who insists on teasing out historic specificities of the Balkan societies and who employs her methods for the decomposition of presupposed social totalities, Močnik trusts existing, already unified discourses on ideology, textual rather than archival analysis, to speak on behalf of Balkan identity. Such a position Močnik inherited from the not so distant past. As a prominent member of a loosely structured circle of radical theorists and artists from Slovenia who during the eighties quite successfully challenged socialist ideology by taking it at its word, forcing its collapse and achieving national liberation, Močnik prefers specific experience over historic specificity because, in his view, it represents Balkan identity not as an artifact of the past, but rather as dynamic identity shaping itself by responding to the present ideology rather than to the past.

Balkanism as Cultural Exorcism

The Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner, born in Kraljevac, now part of Croatia, once prophetically said that the difference between natural and social parasitism is that in nature, simpler organisms live off more complex organisms, but in society, more complex societies live off simpler ones. Such a relationship, arguably, holds today between the more complex liberal democracies, or globalizing societies, and the Balkans.

Similarly, on the relation between liberal democracies and their peripheries, Slavoj Žižek has argued that the explosion of violent nationalisms in the Balkans, and particularly in the former Yugoslavia, should be attributed to the inner logic of Western capitalism. Although distant in space, the nationalistic reconstruction of Eastern Europe in general and the Balkans in particular is not external to the mechanisms through which liberal democracies invented and preserve themselves in history. “It is as if democracy,” he writes, “which in the West shows more and more signs of decay and crisis and is lost in bureaucratic routine and publicity-style election campaigns, is being rediscovered in Eastern Europe in all its freshness and novelty.”²¹ The “*inner antagonism inherent in these communities*”²² and the “*inherent structural imbalance*,”²³ Žižek casts into relief, may potentially open an internal collapse of a social consensus. But this collapse has been played out in the Southeastern peripheries of Europe as the conflicts of and on behalf of the center. Liberal democracies not only channel internal vindictiveness onto the periphery to preserve themselves from the inner conflicts endemic to the structure of capitalism, but more importantly, to fall in love with themselves, with a face-lifted capitalism without conflicts—a superficially purified, morally rejuvenated object of self-desire.

This process of self-beautification at the price of the other’s ugliness goes back to the beginnings of democracy. Did not Athena in Aeschylus’s *Oresteia* mastermind the first democracy by persuading the citizens of Athens to redirect their vengeance from each other to “the stranger” in order to establish the rule of law rather than of a tribal vengeance? Did she not in return guarantee to eliminate “grief and pain,” grant them “some definite powers,” and offer them a way of life worshiped by others? And did not a chorus in *Oresteia* chant: “But man with man and state with state shall vow the pledge of common hate and common friendship, that for man hath oft made blessing, out of ban, be ours unto all time”?²⁴ The heart of tragedy still beats in the chests of civilized Europe, while *Balkanism*’s poisonous milk drips from her breast. And just as the collective vengeance of the liberal democracies holds European nation-states together in a mode of self-beautification and pleasure, it became the conceptual force behind both Slobodan Milošević’s

beautification of the nation-state by cleansing “Serb land” of “the Orient” and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia to stop “ugly” Serbian nationalism. By the end of the nineties, *Balkanism* had permeated the media, military, and academic apparatuses of Western democracies, creating a consensus for what Noam Chomsky calls “the new military humanism”²⁵ of the world’s former colonial masters, now united in NATO. As the war in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia attests, *Balkanism* not only represents the Balkans as a place of violence, but also in part *introduces violence into the Balkans on behalf of its concepts*.

The authors in this volume do not overlook the fact that Balkan identity has been a potent channeling tool in the cultural exorcism of civilized Europe. They do not languish in passive blame. They seize the occasion to mount an important critique of liberal democracy and its violent self-beautification. Not a coincidence, then that these scholars find an ally in Carl Schmitt rather than Jürgen Habermas. Speaking from within the world’s center of “formal rationality” Habermas’s apology for liberal democracy and his justification of NATO’s war against Serbia and Montenegro advanced the process of self-beautification, but had little to contribute to a critical understanding of the aesthetics of the Enlightenment and of European modernity, and their invention of Balkan as metaphor. In “Carl Schmitt on Kosovo or Taking War Seriously,” Grigoris Ananiadis uses Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracies to unpack the political history of liberal democracy and its contemporary moral rebirth. Challenged by Balkan irrational nationalism, European liberal democracies, in order to reaffirm their Enlightenment foundations and defend modernity, revamped the medieval concept of “just war.” Ananiadis scrutinizes the consensus reached between such potential enemies.

Habermas and Myriam Revault d’Alonnes, on the one end and Wesley Clark, the NATO head general, on the other, converge at the notion of a “just war” based on principles of rationality and universal justice. Schmitt argued that this Medieval concept of war has been secularized by the Enlightenment and transformed into a “legal war,” a legal instrument of a sovereign state. And yet, as Ananiadis points out, these Enlightenment premises about war and justice clash with the theological origin of the term “just war,” which was employed by the Catholic Church to mount “total war” against infidels. In spite of NATO’s “limited objectives in Serbia, the war’s “collateral damage” was foreseeable and intentional. Contrary to the views of the above-mentioned philosophers, NATO reintroduced a “quasi-total war” under the cover of a “just war.”

Some might challenge Ananiadis’s argument as farfetched and inconsistent with the facts on the ground, or even question what Schmitt has to do with the theme

of this book, with Balkan as metaphor. Did we not witness, such critics would press, one of the most polarized debates between interventionists and isolationists proving the lack of common consensus precisely in regard to this war? Indeed, one may point to, but also dismiss, the interventionists-isolationist "What should we do with the Balkans?" debate by observing that there was no genuine rupture of western social consensus. While interventionists clamored for military punishment to halt Serbian barbarism, isolationists reckoned that "the Balkans were not worth the bones of one healthy Pomeranian grenadier." Though superficially opposite, both viewed the Balkan people as less than civilized, an over-familiar, long-established, disingenuous, domestically self-congratulating and placating position which is a prelude to instructive vengeance and domination. We can thus conclude that a "just war" is a war with a face-lift, one whose ugly parts have been artfully adjusted and concealed; terms like "legal war," "limited objective," and "collateral damage" belong to the moral cosmetics of liberal democracies, equally beautifying the faces of NATO generals and German Greens.

Vampires Fight Back

In the introduction to her book *The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics*,²⁶ Kriss Ravetto unmasks precisely this mechanism of cultural exorcism found in the writing of such prominent liberal writers as Susan Sontag, who can simultaneously call upon NATO's plan to destroy the ugly face of Serbian fascism while aestheticizing "civilized fascism."²⁷ This "insidious disassociation" and reconstruction of Serbian fascism purifies not only the bombs that fell over Dresden, Hiroshima, or Hanoi, but helps pasteurize Eurofascism, ever incorporating it in the Western project of self-beautification. Where did the ugly blood of Europe go? Where are the Holocaust demons? The knowledge of Balkan violence, *Balkanism*, then, is also a knowledge of Western peace, both of which have historically figured in representations of the vampire, which British journalist Misha Glenny once called "the single most important metaphor in representations of the Balkans." Could it be then that Bram Stoker's *Dracula* can provide a clue to Europe's genealogy of violence? Unlike the trash on a barge in New York City harbor, which nobody wants to claim, the blood drained from Eurofascism is at home in the bodies in Balkan vampires.

Implicitly or explicitly, Balkan authors have begun to incorporate this imposed perception into their analyses. This is not because they wish to occlude responsibility for the atrocities committed by and upon the Balkans, but rather would complicate the question of responsibility. Two of the contributors to this volume, Vesna

Goldsworthy and Tomislav Longinović, focus specifically on the metaphor of the vampire in relation to mainstream media representation of the Balkan conflict. Goldsworthy argues in “Invention and In(ter)vention: The Rhetoric of Balkanization” that the “(young) lifeblood of the Balkans” has been sucked by an “old world sapped of all energy.” This inverted relation between Western peace and Balkan blood reverses the stereotype of the Balkan vampire, with blood now streaming in the opposite direction. This image dominates Tomislav Longinović’s essay “Vampires Like Us: Gothic Imaginary and ‘the serbs.’” Mainstream Western media’s perverse fascination with Serbian atrocities, Longinović argues, positions Serbian atrocities in relation to a Western audience’s forbidden phantasms. To the extent that the killings committed by the Serbs activated the U.S. war machine only during the night, the stalker technology employed by U.S. planes dropping bombs on Serbia resembled immense bats, and the dead bodies visible on American electronic screens each morning invoked a vampire’s now bloodless chamber. In Longinović’s view, the Gothic semiotics of the U.S. military complex revealed the concealed pleasures of a reversed vampirism.

Goldsworthy’s and Longinović’s essay exemplify what could conditionally be called an *external* critique of Serb identity, that is, a critique of stereotyping external to Serbian identity formation. The other mode of critique, what could conditionally be called an *internal* method, does not take Serbian subjectivity for granted as a completed selfhood, but treats Serbian subjectivity and the symbolic order which forms it as its central problem. In the same way Edmund Husserl established a radical position by questioning philosophy’s assumptions about the world it sought to understand and explain, the second method achieves the same radical move by establishing an object of cultural criticism within the nationalist narrative responsible for the interpellation of Serbian subjectivity. The study of Serbian subjectivity need not be understood as the reintroduction of the humanistic discourse on selfhood, nor even less as an apology for the nationalistic narrative, but rather as a strategic decoy to tease from it the enigmatic “psychic life of power.”

This is exactly what the Serbian philosopher Radomir Konstantinović managed to do in his book *Filozofija Palanke* [*Philosophy of Provincialism*]. When the text of this book first aired on Belgrade radio in 1969, and appeared in print later that year, it immediately attracted a cult following among Serbian intellectuals and student activists fighting for reforms. Konstantinović was a prophetic reader of the signs around him in Belgrade in the 1960s; he understood that what looked from a superficial standpoint like the democratization and internationalization of Serbian society was not the real thing. As Slovene art theorist Eda Čufer has perceptively

written in a personal correspondence, “Konstantinović speaks in this book about the secret fears of the provincial mind, the unspoken frustrations which lead to iron laws and hidden logics—the punishment of difference which makes individualism impossible within the parochial system. He saw the self-destructive and paranoid tendencies of Serbia in the 1960s, and was among the first to see what they would lead to in the 1990s—the completion of Belgrade’s transformation of itself from metropolis to village.”²⁸ Forty years after its first publication, this book enjoys the unusual status of being a virtually unique example of indigenous Balkan discourse independent of European philosophy, and as such it should be an essential component for the new cultural studies of the region which we hope this book initiates. Developed as a study of the spirit of the *palanka* or market-town mentality, Konstantinović’s book discerns at the margin of Enlightened Europe an oppositional rationality, the provincial mind versus Hegelian cosmopolitan reason. While the latter is open to the world with relational subjectivity, the reasoning of the provincial mind closes itself into a subjectivity that excludes the world. To totalize itself as a closed world, the reasoning of the parochial mind must build a wall around itself. Never stated explicitly, Konstantinović’s book is about Serbian *Geist*.

How does the rationality of the provincial mind constitute, for example, Serb nationalism? Branka Arsić takes up this question in her essay “Queer Serbs,” arguing that the rationality of the provincial mind is deeply entrenched within the homosexual economy of Serbian nationalist power. An ancient Serbian poem describes three brothers building the walls of a city, who to secure the life of the wall must satisfy a female, perhaps lesbian fairy’s request to brick one of their wives into the walls, leaving the brothers alone behind their walls, their remaining wives presumably demoralized and bonded by trauma, the fairy with the entombed woman in the symbolic world of the wall representing the requisite homosexual economy of pleasure constitutive of Serbian nationalism. When Serbian men shouted in response to Slobodan Milošević’s famous call to Serb unity, “Slobodan we love you!” he replied “I love you too,” which resonates with a line by a Serbian romantic poet Sima Pandurović, “It seems that we, the tired children of this century, are no longer interested in the other, beautiful sex. . . .”²⁹ In these expressions of sentiment by Serbian men, Arsić sees the building of a nation by the sacrificial exclusion of women. “But to build the woman into the city walls,” Arsić writes, “does not mean to get rid of her. For her body will go through a miraculous process of ‘transubstantiation’; her body will become the body of the city or of the territory. The dead women lives as the very body of the bodiless nation and the so-called ‘national spirit’ is nothing other than the life of a dead woman.” Thus the national territory

marked by the city walls has been claimed, conquered or defended in the name of “dead women.”

Although written in the sixties, *Filozofija Palanke* anticipated to a large extent Foucault’s discourse on sexuality and knowledge. Longinovic and Arsić complicate, each in different ways, Konstantinović’s propositions regarding the ratios of power and pleasure in the representation of a Serb national identity. Foucault argued that not only rationality but also pleasure organizes concepts into systems of knowledge and power. Insofar as the Balkans represent the inverse and forbidden desire of the West, the region is, in the Foucauldian sense, the object of a perverse pleasure. In his chapter “Serbian Discourse on Method,” Konstantinović develops the thesis that a philosophical method in the closed world of a provincial rationality must confront procreative sexuality as a norm of tribal rationality and collective identity. In “Sexualizing the Serb,” Dusan I. Bjelić, and Lucinda Cole demonstrate how *knowing* Serb sexuality as a new *scientia sexualis* generates what Foucault calls the “pleasure of analysis.” The sexuality of South Slavs and especially Serbs has thus served, at particular historical moments, to stabilize Western schemes of sexual self-representation as well as the Serb sexual self-orientalization. Consistent with Konstantinović’s position of elucidating a rationality of Serb parochialism from within its own totalizing logic rather than from outside as an occidental tourist, Arsić, Bjelić, and Cole emphasize, following Konstantinović’s “Serbian Discourse on Method,” that sexual identity must be placed at the core of any serious cultural criticism of the region.

Yet the role of pleasure in *Balkanism* also allows Balkan scholars to mount resistance to the imperial culture of globalization. Balkan food, films, music, and literature have all shaped the representation of the Balkans. It is not uncommon to hear in conversation among those who have toured the Balkans that Balkan food is too fatty, that Balkan movies glorify irrationality and violence, that Balkan music is trashy, or that Balkan literature is tribal. Indeed, Balkan film and film music is studiously resistant to both Western cinematic and musical aesthetics. Thus Stathis Gourgouris, in “Hypnosis and Critique (Film Music for the Balkans),” analyzes the ecstatic as a narrative strategy of suspension in Theo Angelopoulos’s *Ulysses’ Gaze* and Emir Kusturica’s *Underground*, as well as in music composed by Eleni Karaindrou and Goran Bregović. Unlike most Western movies, music here is not a decorative complement to the film narrative, but an autonomous element of cinematic structure. This status permits composers not only to resist the global codes of film music established by Hollywood’s imperial culture, but also to mount an aesthetic critique sensitive to the Balkan cultural locale. Karaindrou’s music induces

moments of suspension in Angelopoulos’s meditation on Balkan history; Bregović’s music induces ecstasies in Kosturica’s narrative on the war in the former Yugoslavia. Yet both lead to hypnosis. For Gourgouris, such hypnosis is a moment of self-formulation, a nation’s imaginary performative, or evolution as a dreaming nation.

It is unusual, however, for Balkan scholars to praise Kusturica’s movies, a peculiar cultural phenomena which needs a brief unpacking. Rejecting the worldwide success of Kusturica’s films and Bregović’s music is *de rigueur* for many Balkan intellectuals. They fear that, in glorifying Balkan stereotypes of violent gloom and reckless extravagance entertaining the West with their “reverse racism,”³⁰ Kusturica and Bregović interfere with their process of disidentification with nationalism and with their efforts to decontaminate their cultures from nationalistic signifiers. Western scholars who recognized in Kusturica’s movies an alternative to Hollywood and a refreshing attempt to reshape the codes of global culture remain puzzled by this attitude. Perhaps the modernity of Western scholars was secured and not threatened by Kusturica’s films, or perhaps they located the cultural battlelines for defining global community elsewhere, and were able to focus on a different set of issues. In any case, many Balkan intellectuals reflexively distanced themselves from Kusturica’s portrayal of the Balkans as part of their resistance to nationalism. Whether this was an oblique manifestation of “nesting orientalism” remains to be investigated. However, when Kusturica’s movies, Bregović’s music, or other signifiers of former cultural wars are pitted against the emerging codes of global cultural shallowness, as Gourgouris does, they may be resignified as cultural sites of genuine resistance and triumphant critique, rather than as an apology for nationalism.

Indeed, the rapid acceptance of the cultural codes of a global society is enormously tempting for Balkan intellectuals eager to be recognized as members of the world discursive community. But this universalized globalism, as has been long established, is ethnic too: it emanates from “whiteness” as concealed ethnicity.³¹ The challenge for Balkan scholars, despite their desire for a modern non-ethnic identity, remains one of recognizing how resistance to consumerist globalism is corollary to their resistance to nationalist myopia.

Unstable Identity

As a regime of knowledge production, *Balkanism* relies on figurative language and metaphor. For the Ottomans, as well as for Western colonial cultures, the Balkans formed the “bridge” between the East and the West, a metaphor naturalized by Ivo Andrić in his Nobel Prize-winning novel, *The Bridge over the Drina*. That metaphor

of the “bridge” induces endless hermeneutical circles which transform a “bridge” into a “wall,” dividing rather than connecting. It is imperative that we critically examine the history of figurative language and its relation to the Balkans.³²

Just as they have with the vampire, Balkan writers have appropriated other Western metaphors to define themselves. For Todorova, for example, the bridge metaphor is central. A bridge between East and West reveals the Balkan experience of in-betweenness. Other writers emphasize the instability of the Balkans themselves as a sign. What “Balkan” names, according to Todorova, is neither here nor there but always in-between.³³ Yet during the Kosovo war and the introduction of the Stability Pact for the region, the name “Balkans” suddenly disappeared from the media and was replaced with “Southeast Europe.”

Such nominative instability is likewise evident in the construction of particular ethnic identities. Yet perhaps the contradictions of Balkan identity can be traced most clearly through Serbian history: Serbs have comprised an empire and a colony, holocaust victims and holocaust victimizers. The representational schemas deployed by themselves and others reflect these contradictions. Sometimes they are represented as either threats or guardians at the gates of Western civilization—others, as the only remaining European barbarians, equally susceptible to bribery and betrayal. And perhaps no other ethnic group has received so much external scrutiny (and orientalist treatment) as the Serbs in the last decade of the twentieth century, when they mounted ethnic wars against almost everybody. But similar contradictions exist in other Balkan ethnic identities. Adrian Cioroianu examines the history of the paradoxical Romanian identity in “The Impossible Escape: Romanians and the Balkans.” Cioroianu argues that Romanian identity has been historically torn between a desire to escape and a desire to stay in the Balkan region. He concludes that to “run away from the Balkans would be but a stage in the Romanians’ much wanted escape from the East; the more persistently they are pushed back to the Balkans and the East, the more difficult their endeavor.” Vesna Kesić, in “Muslim Women, Croatian Women, Serbian Women, Albanian Women . . .,” makes similar claims concerning Balkan gender identity. Caught between their men’s wars and their ties to other women, women from the former Yugoslavia are themselves split between their gender and their ethnic identities, between their emancipation and their demographic service to the nation.

Subjectivity is framed in relation to both symbolic and institutional identity, but it is never fixed. The Balkan subject constantly oscillates between internalizing and distancing him or herself from group symbols. In “The Dark Intimacy: Maps of

Identities, Acts of Identification,” Alexander Kiossev does not settle for the veneer of semiotic stability, introducing instead a “politics of questioning” by asking how Balkan identity is possible in the first place. War shapes Balkan ethnic identity, replies Ugo Vlaisavljević. Following Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that war is a total *event* (cultural as well as military), Vlaisavljević writes in “The South Slav Identity and the Ultimate War-Reality” that the periodic reconstitution of *ethnie* in the Balkans can be achieved properly only through war. In wars, the ethnic Self operates as an imaginary symbolic body that invents its entire (subjective) reality. By establishing a peculiar relation between the imaginary and the real, war becomes an event promoting the self-metamorphosis of identity, one in which identity is trapped between the desire to fit into larger geopolitical schemes of power, or to preserve a nationally distinct version of modernity. The Balkans, Ivaylo Ditchev argues in “The Eros of Identity,” have joined the global market of identity with their enormous “natural” resources of victimization and horror, the other side of their *jouissance*—leisure, cuisine, and exoticism. But what appears to be a choice merely plays into the dialectics of the system. “Victimary capitals (post-communist countries, then Bosnia, Kosovo),” he writes, “are moneyed on the media market; thus it was the bloody succession of wars in former Yugoslavia that changed the attitude towards the region, obliging the EU to adopt a quicker procedure of integrating it, developing the Stability pact for financial aid, etc.” Henceforth, Ditchev concludes on a critical note that Balkan modernists like dramatist Eugene Ionesco, literary theorist Julia Kristeva, or director Angelopoulos, these figures of universalism are being replaced by “exclusive resellers of local color like writer Ismail Kadare, musician Goran Bregović, or director Emir Kusturica.”

In assembling this book, we have primarily enlisted authors born and educated in the Balkans. We do not mean to suggest that Balkan authors have exclusive rights, or even a contextual (regional) mandate, to competently present and represent the Balkans. We do hope to offer, however, a corrective counterpoint to currently circulating representations of the Balkans. At best, these authors attempt to show how an ancient place—the Balkans—became the center of a deep contemporary cultural, political, and identity rupture between the “global” and the “local,” a rupture which, having grown increasingly confrontational, now involves the “global” and the “local” turning horrifying caricatures upon each other. No one feels the discursive impact of this rupture as dramatically as these authors.

For most of these authors, the Balkans are not merely a discursive construct but part of their intellectual, cultural, and personal identity. Through their work and public presentations, others recognize these scholars, sometimes as objects of *Balkanism*, to be floating clouds of the Balkan metaphor which occasionally create melodramatic storms. In their daily lives, however, these authors invariably resist this self-generated or imposed metaphoric identity. Without that identity has one barely a proper name, whether in the Balkans or in the West. And so the authors in this volume maintain a radical mode of being in the world. They do not succumb to the disjunctive stereotypes of either the global or local position, those perennial reductive prejudices so often operative in representing the Balkans. None of the authors speak on behalf of the abstract homogeneity of the Balkans in order to confront a homogeneous West; nor does anyone attempt to promote or impose an exclusive or exceptional geo-political identity. When pressed, these writers would probably disagree, for example, about the NATO bombing of Serbia, and they would do so for unpredictable reasons. They examine two differentiated and pluralistic conceptions of the Balkans: a “colonial” and “postcolonial” perspective. The latter comprises a new, self-critical mode of reflection about the Balkans by those from the Balkans, one which many of their essays explore. Our overarching goal is to strike a delicate balance between competing visions and representations of the Balkans and the West, or more generally speaking, of the Orient and the Occident. And yet despite this effort, we must acknowledge that the authors’ differentiated positions are not immune to the contradictions of a Balkan identity. While disagreeing on many issues, such as whether the Balkans are a metaphor, or whether Westerners or Serbs are vampires, the authors suggest there is a need to homogenize the West in order to de-homogenize the Balkans. Whether this is a postcolonial irony, a moment of fortuitous occidentalization, or just another paradoxical avatar of the Balkan identity-enigma remains to be seen.

Although discursive and theoretical resistance to *Balkanism* is a largely domestic (Balkan) phenomenon, the discursive strategies of that resistance primarily belong to Western academicians. Post-structuralism, post-modernism, deconstruction, psycho-analysis, post-colonialism, and critical multi-culturalism, in different ways and through parallel efforts, have opened new frontiers of resistance to the traditions concomitant to the Western Enlightenment, namely patriarchy, racism, colonialism, and sexism. In *Balkanism*, theorists have produced a useful account of the proliferation of power relations, which emanates from the center and radiates throughout the periphery. This volume assists in achieving a necessary view on the

mechanisms of domination from the view of minority, peripheral, and marginal groups multiplying every globalizing day in uncountable numbers, far from our homes, yet also in and around them. For this changing reality Eagleton has an important warning to announce to those in the center who still may have their "hearing aid switched off":

While this crisis has broken out with a vengeance on the troubled margins of Europe, the Western heartland can still for the moment indulge the luxury of not seeing themselves from the outside, as a particular, minority form of life, as a specific culture rather than as civilization itself. . . . The United States in particular has always had extreme difficulty in seeing itself from the outside, and something of this self-opacity is revealed in Richard Rorty's richly provocative essay, which finds no difficulty in enlisting in the "human rights culture" a nation (his own) which has constantly flouted the rights of its own minorities, not to speak of those of cultures far from its shores.³⁴

Consistent with Eagleton's warning, the authors and editors of this volume not only wish to enhance the center through improved understanding of the dynamics of their region of origin, but when considering the internal optics of globalization and fragmentation, to *gaze* back at those who *gaze* at them in order to reverse the panoptical process of the center. In this respect, *Balkanism* has bestowed on Balkan scholars an opportunity to mount representational resistance against the imperial depredations and shallowness of global culture. These authors resist any representational strategy that leads to the decomposition of the Balkans into functional fragments—as NATO army bases, as digital maps, or as the "Mall of the Balkans"—to wire them into the global market as an e-Balkans. Since the Balkan countries lack both wealth and might, the region's best resistance to globalization and fragmentation may not be to obstruct the inevitable process of the world community, but to foster an alliance of cultural critics across ethnic and professional lines. The authors in this volume aim to institute new discursive conditions for the formation of Balkan identity around which cultural fragments of Balkanhood abandoned as road kill on the highway of globalization may be reassembled into a vital parliament of our hybrid Balkan cultures.

Notes

1. Fredric Jameson, "Conversation on the New World Order," in Robin Blackburn, ed., *After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and Future of Socialism* (New York: Verso, 1991), 260. Had Jameson genuinely focused on the East rather than on his own discourse—or if he did not see the other as the "East"—Jameson would have realized, as we did that afternoon, that if one is willing to listen to the "other" then there is no real struggle for "discursive rules" between the West and the East because people of the Balkans and of

the United States, as Ludwig Wittgenstein would say, already agree in “forms of life.” About the extended critique of Jameson’s troublesome notion of the “other” see Aijaz Ahmad’s “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory,’” *Social Text* 17 (fall 1987).

2. Terry Eagleton, Preface to *The Politics of Human Rights*, ed. Obrad Savić (New York: Verso, 1999), vi.

3. Complaining about the Eastern European intellectuals’ ability to understand the Western’s intellectual concerns, Jameson claims: “The more their truths are couched in Orwellian language, the more tedious they become for us; the more our truths demand expression in even the weakest forms of Marxian language—that or simple social democracy say, or even the welfare state or social justice, or equality—the more immediately do the Eastern hearing aids get switched off.” (Blackburn, *After*, 260.) Also see Susan Buck-Morss’s *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), and how Jameson’s orientalizing of Eastern European intellectuals in its ability to sweep over the heterogeneous intellectual territory of the “East” may still gain a theoretical authority even when the author claims an open minded ethnography in surveying the “Eastern” intellectual landscape.

4. Cornel West, “The New Cultural Politics of Difference,” *The Cultural Studies Reader*, 2d ed., ed. Simon During (London: Routledge, 2000), 264.

5. A recent book by Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, in which he explains Serbian acts of genocide by invoking Byzantine ties between the Orthodox religion and the Serbian state, is a fresh example of the application of Byzantism (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

6. Gayatri Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 56.

7. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

8. Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

9. Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of Modern Greece* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996).

10. Milica Bakic-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalism: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” *Slavic Review* 54, no. 4 (winter 1995), 917–931.

11. Ibid.

12. Richard G. Fox, “East of Said,” in *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*, ed. Michael Sprinker (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 151.

13. See James G. Carrier, ed., *Occidentalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

14. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 334, 338.

15. Les Back and John Solomons, eds., *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2000), 475.

16. Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: The World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 123.

17. Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics* (London: Verso, 1997), 72.

18. K. E. Fleming, “*Orientalism*, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography,” *American Historical Review*, October 2000, 1215.
19. Fleming, *ibid.*, 1232.
20. A partial list of periodicals on the Balkans published in English follows. Bulgaria: *Balkan Neighbours* (monthly). Greece: *Thesis* (monthly); *Balkanism* (quarterly). Macedonia: *Balkan Forum* (quarterly); *The Macedonian Times* (monthly). Turkey: *Turkish Review of Balkanism* (annual); *Balkanism* (annual). Serbia-Montenegro: *Review of International Affairs* (quarterly); *Newsletter* (bimonthly), CSS Survey (monthly).
21. Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), 200.
22. Žižek, *Terryng*, 206.
23. *Ibid.*, 209.
24. Aeschylus, *Oresteia*, translated by E. D. A. Mowhead (<http://classics.mit.edu/Aeschylus/eumendides.html>).
25. Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1999).
26. Kriss Ravetto, *The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
27. Susan Sontag, “‘There’ and ‘Here’: A Lament for Bosnia,” *Nation* 261, no. 22 (December 25, 1995), on the web: <http://www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9601/msg00037.html>;
“Why are we in Kosovo?,” *New York Times*, May 2, 1999, on the web: <http://www.nbi.dk/~predrag/projects/SontagKosovo.html>.
28. Eda Čufer, personal correspondence.
29. Sima Pandurović, “Mrtva Draga” (“A Dead Darling”), quoted in Radomir Konstantinović, *Filozofija Palanke* (Philosophy of Provincialism) (Belgrade: NOLIT, 1969), 216.
30. Slavoj Žižek writes: “Finally, there is the reverse racism which celebrates the exotic authenticity of the Balkan Other, as in the notion of Serbs who, in contrast to inhibited, anaemic Western Europeans, still exhibit a prodigious lust for life—this last form of racism plays a crucial role in the success of Emir Kusturica’s films in the West.” (*The Fragile Absolute, or why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for?* [New York: Verso 2000], 5).
31. Richard Dyer, “The Matter of Whiteness,” *Theories of Race and Racism*, ed. Les Back and John Solomons (New York: Routledge, 2000), 539–548; Peter McLaren, “White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Multiculturalism,” *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. David T. Goldberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 45–74.
32. Eric Cheyfitz has given an instructive historical account of this relation. The beginning of British colonial history, he argues, fundamentally transformed the English language; its structures split into two hierarchically ordered languages, one figurative and the other literal. The British empire emphasized the eloquence of English, rather than its dialogic and figurative tradition. As a result, democratic dialogue, with its figurative, equivocal, and conflictive play, rigidified into the literal, proper, or univocal language of eloquence. (*The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from Tempest to Tarzan* [Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997], 38). “When this equivocality is repressed,” Cheyfitz continues, “the literal and the figurative aspects of language became hierarchized into absolute and oppositional entities, with the masters occupying the territory of the literal or proper and consigning the slaves to that of the figurative” (38–39). For Roland Barthes, this division of language falls under the division of “national/foreign,” and “familiar/strange,” making a national language strange to itself. Within this imperial hierarchy of language closed into a nation state, imperial language metaphorically represented the rest of the world, including the Balkans, as a colonial subject, even though not one with a modern colonial history.

33. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 18.

34. Eagleton, Preface, vi.

So literally blowing the bridge up will be hard to do if you want to stick to mundane items. What people did in former times to bring down structures was clever use of fire. Pouring flammable liquid over a bridge and setting it on fire might not ultimately destroy a stone bridge, but it will be impassible while it burns and if it takes down enough of the supporting wood and hemp, it may be impassible to anything but single, dextrous acrobats for a long time. Without the peasants, blowing up the bridge ought to be a lot more risky/difficult, so make it appear equally rewarding. E.g. a massive horde is regrouping on top of the bridge; if the players can set off the bomb then it will take out far more enemies than previously expected. Share. Improve this answer. But a blown-out bridge over the treacherous mountain gorge at Funchilin Pass threatened to halt its fighting withdrawal from North Korea. A 29-foot gap in the concrete bridge meant that the Marines would have to abandon all of their vehicles, and carrying out their wounded and dead under fire would be a nearly impossible task. The gap would have to be bridged, but the Marines did not have bridging equipment at Koto-ri. Gen. Edward Almond, to advance up the narrow road from Hungnam deep into the mountains. The aim was to reach the Yalu's border with China. Major General Oliver P. Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, believed that Almond's instructions for the division to move hastily up to the Chosin Reservoir were ill-advised. specific to their discursive locality . Introduction: Blowing Up the "Bridge" 3. In the middle of the nineties, Balkan scholars began to produce groundbreaking work in the English speaking world. The editors of the book in which Slovenian philosopher. Introduction: Blowing Up the "Bridge" 5. Slavoj Žižek's article "Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself!" was recently published Blowing up the Bridge. Miss Cellania Tuesday, June 28, 2011 at 7:48 PM. (YouTube link). Just when I thought I was getting tired of supercuts, Harry Hanrahan strung together the greatest exploding bridge scenes in cinema history, with a satisfyingly appropriate soundtrack. -via The Daily What. Previous Story Next Story. Tags: Movies, Bridges, Supercut, Explosions. Like this? Please share & join us. Neat stuff from the NeatoShop: Newest 3. Newest 3 Comments. BLACKLISTED: texlenin 01Jul11 5:17pm 0. But those were Mother Beautiful Bridges!!! Always with the negative waves, Hounddog; always w How would you say "blow up the bridge"? For the verb blow up we use one verb, but I wonder other languages have just one verb, if I am not mistaken most... How would you say "blow up the bridge"? For the verb blow up we use one verb, but I wonder other languages have just one verb, if I am not mistaken most languages use phrases. Thank. English: blow up the bridge [i.e. destroy the bridge by explosion] Hungarian: hidat felrobbant (hidat = the bridge) Czech: vyhodit most do vzduchu. K. kirahvi.